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ERISA BENEFITS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE AND A NEW YORK DEBTOR'S RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA")1 is a federal regulatory scheme enacted to ensure the
protection and preservation of private pension plans. 2 To en-
courage employers to participate in these plans, Congress coordi-
nated various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
("I.R.C.") with ERISA to provide favorable tax treatment.' As a
result, recent years have seen tremendous growth in the number
and size of ERISA-qualified benefit plans.
Under ERISA, participants may not assign or alienate pen-
sion benefits.5 The statute's complex framework protects pen-
1 Pub. L. No. 93-406, tit. I, § 2, 88 Stat. 832 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461
(1985)).
2 Congress enacted ERISA "in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries,
and to provide for the general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be
made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and ad-
ministration of [employee benefit] plans." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
I The I.R.C. affords ERISA plans as well as other qualified retirement plans
favorable tax treatment. I.R.C. section 401(a) permits employers to deduct contributions
to a trust made exclusively for the benefit of employees. A trust that qualifies under
LR.C. section 401 is exempt from taxation under IR.C. section 501(a). In addition, quali-
fied plans must contain provisions restricting the assignment and alienation of plan ben-
efits. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1986). This section is almost identical to ERISA's section
206(d). See infra note 5.
' Assets held in private pension funds grew from $153 billion dollars in 1970 to
$1,986 trillion dollars in 1989. UNrrED STATES DEPr. oF CoN aca. STAnSCAL ABsRAcr
op THE UNrED STATES, table 597 (111th ed. 1991).
5 ERISA provides:
1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may
not be assigned or alienated.
2) For the purpose of paragraph (1) of this subsection, there shall not be taken
into account any voluntary and revocable assignment of not to exceed 10 per-
cent of any benefit payment, or of any irrevocable assignment or alienation of
benefits executed before September 2, 1974. The preceding sentence shall not
apply to any assignment or alienation made for the purposes of defraying plan
administration costs. For purposes of this paragraph a loan made to a partici-
pant or beneficiary shall not be treated as an assignment or alienation if such
loan is secured by the participant's accrued nonforfeitable benefit and is ex-
empt from the tax imposed by section 4975 of Title 26 (relating to tax on pro-
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sion assets by limiting the ways both employers and employees
can use the assets. In addition, qualified plan benefits cannot be
subject to a garnishment proceeding by a judgment creditor in
satisfaction of a debt. State laws that otherwise permit garnish-
ment are preempted by ERISA, either by operation of the anti-
alienation or the anti-assignment provision,8 or by ERISA's own
mandate that it must supersede all state laws relating to quali-
fied plans.7 The combined purpose of these statutory restraints
is to ensure that benefits due employees or their families would
not be extinguished by garnishment proceedings before retire-
ment and would not be subject to different treatment from state
to state."
The increased number of ERISA plans parallels the explo-
sion of personal bankruptcies in the United States.9 Because
many bankruptcy proceedings involve pension funds,10 a ques-
hibited transactions) by reason of section 4975(d)(1) of Title 26.
ERISA § 206(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1985 & Supp. 1990). However, a voluntary revoca-
ble assignment of up to 10% of benefit payments is permitted. ERISA § 206(d)(2), 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2).
a Several courts have held that ERISA's assignment and alienation provisions create
a general federal exemption for qualified plans from the claims of creditors. In re Gra-
ham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1270.71 (8th Cir. 1984), citing Commercial Mortgage Ins., Inc. v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 526 F. Supp. 510, 516-518 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Further, the
Supreme Court's decision in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365
(1990), made clear that placing pension benefits in a constructive trust after a finding
that the recipient was embezzling pension funds is prohibited by the anti-alienation and
anti-assignment provisions found in ERISA section 206(d)(1).
7 ERISA preempts state law as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this sub-
chapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b)
of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
8 One of the purposes of ERISA is to expand private retirement plans and "increase
the number of participants receiving private retirement benefits." H.R. REP. No. 533,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4640. See also, In re
Wimmer, 121 B.R. 539, 541 (C.D. Ill. 1990) ("To insure national uniformity in employee
benefit laws, Section 1144(a) of ERISA provides that ERISA shall supersede any and all
state laws insofar as they may relate to any employee benefit plan.").
' The number of bankruptcy petitions filed in the United States increased from
360,329 in 1981 to 642,993 in 1989, a 78% increase. Of petitions filed in 1989, 457,240
(71%) sought relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATEs, table 884 (111th Edition 1991).
10 For the purposes of deciding whether ERISA pension funds are included in the
bankruptcy estate, this Note will refer only to the Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings of
individual debtors.
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tion frequently raised is whether these funds are subject to cred-
itors' claims-as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,22 with its
broad definition of a debtor's estate, seems to imply-or whether
these funds should be exempted under ERISA. On the one hand,
under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor's estate' 2 includes all legal
and equitable interests of a debtor.1 3 Typically included in the
estate are cash, other accounts readily accessible by the debtor,14
real property held solely or jointly by the debtor or a partner-
ship interest. 5 In addition, payments to the debtor, although re-
ceived after bankruptcy, may be included in the estate to the
extent that they represent pre-bankruptcy earnings or prop-
erty.16 Thus, assets in pension plans arguably fall within the def-
inition of property of the estate. 7
-- Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1990).
(hereinafter Bankruptcy Code or Code.))
12 Filing a bankruptcy petition creates an estate that is comprised of all legal "and
equitable interests of the debtor in property at the commencement of the case." 11
U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1990).
13 Id.
" Such accounts could include Individual Retirement Accounts (I.R.A.) or Keogh
plans. An LR-A. is an account established by an employee not covered by a governmental
or employer-sponsored retirement plan to make annual tax-deductible contributions for
his or her future benefit I.R.C. § 408 (1988). To obtain tax benefits, a trust or custodial
account must be established. The trustee must be either a bank, another person, or an
organization that meets Internal Revenue Service qualifications. Similarly, a Keogh plan
allows a self-employed individual to establish a qualified pension or profit sharing plan
in order to obtain favorable tax incentives. I.R.C. § 401(a)(13). Both of these plans allow
the settlor (the creator of the trust or account) to reach the corpus (body) of the trust
upon the imposition of a penalty, usually tax disqualification. Because the debtor is per-
mitted immediate access to funds upon the payment of a penalty, such accounts have
been held to be akin to a savings plan. In re Kramer, 128 B.R. 707 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1991), infra note 160, following In re lacono, 120 B.R. 691 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990), infra
note 117.
" Intangibles are also included in the estate. Section 541(a) sweeps broadly, and can
include the debtor's rights in a commercial or residential lease, a copyright or trademark,
or a contract to supply goods or services. See, e.g., Matter of Fugazy, 124 B.R. 426, 430
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (FCC license held by debtor is property of the estate); In re
Johann, 125 B.I. 679, 682 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (proprietary rights and technology
related to computer software are included as property of the estate); In re Family Health
Services, Inc., 105 B.R. 937, 943 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989) (debtor's good vill and contracts
with subscribers are property of the estate); In re Altchek, 124 B.R. 944, 936 (Banl-.
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (income from debtor's partnership interest is property of the estate).
16 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6). For example, post-petition payments from a pension or
profit sharing plan, earned or accumulated by the debtor prior to bankruptcy, are in-
cluded in the estate. They may later be exempted through section 522(d) of the Code.
See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
"' 11 U.S.C. section 541(c)(2) creates a narrow exception by excluding certain prop-
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On the other hand, once the estate has been determined,
certain property initially included may later be exempted
through federal or state statutory schemes."' The Code allows a
debtor to retain those assets necessary for his or her own use
after the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding. By this
method, a debtor is afforded the opportunity for a "fresh
start"1 9 upon a discharge from pre-petition debts-an essential
goal of the Bankruptcy Code.20 Furthermore, in light of ERISA's
erty from the estate. By enacting this subsection, Congress sought to preserve restric-
tions on the transfer of the debtor's interest in a spendthrift trust to the extent that the
restriction is also recognized by state law. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
Property thus excluded cannot be reached by creditors. Whether ERISA's restrictions on
transfers are also included within the scope of section 541(c)(2) will be addressed in Part
I of this Note.
" Under section 522 of the Code, the debtor may exempt certain property that
would otherwise be subject to the claims of creditors. Section 522(b) allows the debtor to
choose between a series of exemptions prescribed by the Code in subsection (d), and
those state law exemptions offered to a debtor by the State in which he or she is domi-
ciled. For example, a debtor utilizing the federal exemptions would be permitted to ex-
empt his or her interest in a homestead, a motor vehicle, household goods, furnishings,
clothing, and other items held primarily for personal use. Specified payments to the
debtor for injury, wrongful death, life insurance, or workers' compensation may also be
exempted to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor's support. 11 U.S.C. §
522(d)(1-11). A debtor choosing to utilize his or her state exemptions would be permit-
ted to exempt only property in accordance with that state's particular exemption sched-
ule. Assuming that most debtors would choose the more generous list of exemptions, the
amount of property left after discharge could vary from state to state, even when pre-
bankruptcy assets were equal. Further, if the debtor chooses the state exemptions, sec-
tion 522(b)(2)(A) allows the debtor to exempt property that is exempt "under Federal
law" other than that listed in subsection (d).
The Code also allows a state to dictate that debtors in that state use the state ex-
emption scheme. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). States that do not allow debtors to choose the
Code's exemptions are said to have "opted out" of the federal exemption scheme, a path
New York has followed. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 284 (McKinney 1990). The opt-out
provision found in the Code has been challenged based on arguments that it usurps Con-
gress's power to establish uniform laws on bankruptcies and that it impermissibly dele-
gates such powers to the states. The provision has been upheld. Matter of Sullivan, 680
F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982).
1" Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966). Before Segal, the Court held that "(ilt
is the twofold purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to convert the estate of the bankrupt into
cash and distribute it among creditors and then to give the bankrupt a fresh start with
such exemptions and rights as the statute left untouched." Burlingham v. Crouse, 228
U.S. 459, 473 (1913).
20 Congress's intent regarding bankruptcy exemptions is expressed as follows:
The historical purpose of these exemption laws has been to protect a debtor
from his creditors, to provide him with the basic necessities of life so that even
if his creditors levy on all of his nonexempt property, the debtor will not be
left destitute and a public charge . . . [the bill] adopts the position that there
is a Federal interest in seeing that a debtor that goes through bankruptcy
[Vol. 68:177
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limits on the alteration of pension funds, a strong argument can
be made that such funds are exempt from the estate for bank-
ruptcy proceedings. This apparent conflict between the Bank-
ruptcy Code and ERISA has divided the courts of appeals, lead-
ing to inconsistent judicial treatment of pension benefits.21
Although the Supreme Court recently considered the strength of
ERISA's anti-alienation provisions in a narrower context,22 the
status of an ERISA-qualified pension plan in bankruptcy has
comes out with adequate possessions to begin his fresh start.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 126, reprinted in 1978 US.C.CAN. 5787, 6097.
21 See In re Coffman, 125 B.R. 238, 239 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (agreeing with the
majority view expressed by the Eighth Circuit in In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir.
1984), the court noted the "minefield of conflicting decisions" within the Western Dis-
trict of Missouri alone). Compare In re Williams, 118 B.R. 812, 815 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1990) (Florida statute § 222.21 that provides an exemption for retirement plans qualified
under I.R.C. § 401 & § 403, does not "relate to" ERISA for preemption purposes), with
In re Smith, 123 B.R. 423, 427 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (debtors' ERISA plan could not
be exempted pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 221.21; state statute sufficiently related to ERISA
and could not survive preemption).
2 Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1990). Guidry
was a former union official of the Sheet Metal Workers International Association. He
also served as a trustee of the union's pension fund. As a result of his employment he
was eligible to receive benefits from three ERISA-qualified pension funds. In 1981 an
investigation by the Department of Labor revealed that Guidry had embezzled more
than $377,000 from the union. He was subsequently convicted of embezzlement, and two
of the plans refused to pay his accrued benefits, asserting that he had forfeited his right
to receive benefits as a result of his criminal conduct. Alternatively, the Union argued
that if Guidry's right to benefits still existed, those benefits should have been paid di-
rectly to the Union, rather than to Guidry. The Union sought the imposition of a con-
structive trust, imposed by equity (as opposed to an ordinary trust intentionally estab-
lished by the settlor for his or another's benefit). Id. at 368.
The Supreme Court rejected the Union's argument. In reversing both the Court of
Appeals and the District Court, the Court upheld ERISA's prohibition on the assign-
ment or alienation of pension benefits, thereby mandating the payment of benefits. De-
spite the compelling circumstances, the Court also declined to impose a constructive
trust on the pension funds in favor of the Union since this would circumvent the protec-
tive, anti-garnishment procedures of ERISA. Id. at 376. Instead, the Court cited the
goals of ERISA to protect pension funds and the interests of beneficiaries from any type
of garnishment- "[C]ertain broad social policies sometimes take precedence over the de-
sire to do equity between particular parties." Id. Guidry, however, did not involve a
bankruptcy proceeding, and therefore ERISA's protective anti-alienation provisions were
not considered in relation to the Bankruptcy Code. See also Ellis Nat'1 Bank of Jackson-
ville v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1986) (ERISA's anti-alienation provisions
did not allow employer to reclaim, through imposition of constructive trust, monies em-
bezzled by employee); Vink v. SHV North America Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (former employer could not refuse to pay ERISA benefits to plan benefi-
ciary, despite the fact that beneficiary, a former employee, was convicted of defrauding
company).
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not yet been determined. The majority of courts have held that
ERISA plans are included in a debtor's estate and thus subject
to the claims of creditors.23 A minority of courts have inter-
preted the Bankruptcy Code to exclude such plans entirely,
based on ERISA's mandatory transfer restrictions. 2' While New
York courts have adhered to the majority view, the New York
State Assembly recently enacted legislation offering generous
treatment of benefit plans to achieve the minority's exclusionary
result.25 This Note reviews both the majority and minority lines
of cases and argues that despite many sound arguments of the
minority view, the majority interpretation achieves a more equi-
table result.Part I of this Note discusses recent judicial treatment of
ERISA-qualified pension plans by both the majority and the mi-
nority interpretations. This Note argues that the majority prop-
erly adheres to congressional intent by viewing the conflict be-
tween the two federal statutes strictly within the bankruptcy
context. Accordingly, this Note finds the Bankruptcy Code to
take priority over ERISA. The minority, on the other hand, pro-
motes the goals of ERISA by sacrificing the meaning and intent
behind the Code. Part II of this Note examines the treatment of
a New York debtor's pension plan under recent amendments to
the state's exemptions law. In seeking to protect the pensions of
self-employed individuals, the New York legislature has ignored
both the rights of creditors and the clear potential for abuse cre-
ated by the statute. More importantly, there is a likelihood of
federal preemption from two sources that has been purposefully
overlooked. The New York law may be found to conflict with
both ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code, and may be superseded
by both statutory schemes.
Finally, this Note concludes that the majority view is the
2, In re Swanson, 873 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352 (9th
Cir. 1985); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Graham, 726 F.2d at
1273; In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Ross, 691 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1982).
2 Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991); Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362
(4th Cir. 1991); In re Lucas, 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1991); In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476
(4th Cir. 1990); In re Komet, 104 B.R. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989); In re Ralstin, 61
B.R. 502 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986); In re Mosley, 42 B.R. 181 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984); In re
Threewitt, 24 B.R. 927 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).
20 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 5205(c) (McKinney 1990) and N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §
282(2)(e) (McKinney 1990) were both amended effective July, 1989. These amendments
are discussed in Part II of this Note.
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better approach and that the New York legislature has adopted
an overly generous view of such plans. The likely result of the
New York statute will be either an abuse of the bankruptcy pro-
cess by debtors who seek to shelter excess income from the
claims of creditors, or the statute's invalidation by operation of
ERISA or by courts in an effort to curb such abuse.
I. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the bank-
ruptcy estate includes "all legal- or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."2 The
bankruptcy estate also includes property, "notwithstanding any
provision that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by
the debtor. '2 7 The legislative history of this section indicates
that Congress intended the statutory definition of property of
the estate to be overly broad so as to promote the efficient dis-
tribution of assets to creditors in satisfaction of pre-petition
debts.2 s Such a definition seems to indicate that once the debtor
has an interest in any type of property, it will be automatically
included in the estate upon bankruptcy.
There is, however, an exception to section 541(c)(1)(A)'s
broad inclusion of property in the estate. Section 541(c)(2) pro-
vides that "a restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of
the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title."2
Therefore, if "applicable nonbankruptcy law" imposes a restric-
tion on the transfer of the debtor's interest in a trust, this inter-
est may be excluded from the bankruptcy estate. While most
courts have interpreted restrictive trust provisions without diffi-
culty,30 many have expressed divergent views regarding the ref-
26 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982).
2 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(A) (1982).
' "The scope of this paragraph is broad.., it includes as property of the estate all
property of the debtor, even that needed for a fresh start." HR. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 367-68 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6323-24. By drawing a line
between the debtor's assets at the moment of bankruptcy and those acquired po3t-peti-
tion, the Code promotes the goal of satisfying creditors' claims while still allowing the
debtor to retain newly acquired property that is necessary to the "bankrupts ability to
make an unencumbered fresh start." Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966). See
supra note 19 and accompanying text.
2. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982).
30 Many trusts commonly contain restrictions that prohibit the transfer of the bene-
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erence to "applicable nonbankruptcy law. '3 1 Should ERISA,
with its prohibitions against alienation and assignment, be in-
cluded as "applicable nonbankruptcy law" within the meaning
of section 541(c)(2), thus making ERISA funds part of the
debtor's estate and subject to creditors' claims?
A. The Majority View
The majority of courts have included ERISA-qualified pen-
sion plans in the bankruptcy estate.2 These courts have held
that the reference to "applicable nonbankruptcy law" is unclear
and have looked to the legislative history of section 541(c)(2) to
ascertain congressional intent.33 These courts have concluded
that Congress intended the statute only to apply to "traditional"
spendthrift trusts. 4 A spendthrift trust is a trust established
and funded by one person for the benefit of another, with re-
strictions on the beneficiary's control. Such restrictions often
consist of a valid restraint, imposed by the terms of the trust or
ficiary's interest, except upon certain conditions. For example, a retirement plan,
whether self-settled or not, may mandate the payment of a tax or interest penalty upon
early withdrawal. In addition, the alienation of any part of a trust-through voluntary
assignment or involuntary garnishment-may be prohibited except upon a showing of
hardship or termination of employment. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. The
above restrictions usually give the debtor some control.
" See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
" The Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have inter-
preted ERISA plans as property of a debtor's estate. See In re Ross, 691 F.2d 81 (2d Cir.
1982); Matter of Brooks, 844 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir.
1983); Matter of LeFeber, 906 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Newman, 903 F.2d 1150
(7th Cir. 1990); In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Kincaid, 917 F.2d
1162 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Lichstrahl, 750
F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985). The First and Tenth Circuits have not yet rendered a deci-
sion on this question.
" Many courts have found § 541(c)(2) unclear as a result of the statutory conflict
between ERISA's anti-alienation provision (11 U.S.C. § 1056(d)), the Bankruptcy Code's
broad inclusion of property in the estate for the benefit of creditors (11 U.S.C. §
541(a)(1)), and ERISA's preemptive provision, that mandates that ERISA must yield to
all other federal laws (29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)). This is discussed in section B of part II of
this Note.
s' The House Report to the 1978 Code states in part:
Subsection (c) invalidates restrictions on the transfer of property of the debtor,
in order that all of the interests of the debtor in property will become property
of the estate . . . .Paragraph (2) of subsection (c), however, preserves restric-
tions on a transfer of a spendthrift trust to the extent that the restriction is
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 369 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6325 (emphasis added).
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by statute, prohibiting alienation of the beneficiary's interest. 5
Concededly, ERISA's non-alienation and non-assignment provi-
sions are valid against creditors under state law."' Most ERISA
plans, however, provide for the voluntary participation and con-
tribution of the debtor. Consequently, courts consider ERISA
plans to be self-settled and therefore do not include ERISA
within the class of "spendthrift" trusts.37
Many courts have looked to other Code provisions to deter-
mine the congressional intent behind section 541(c)(2). Of par-
ticular interest is the specific reference to pension plans found in
section 522-the exemptions section of the Code. Section
522(d)(10)(E) provides:
ExEMPnONS. (d) The following property may be exempted under sub-
section (b)(1) of this section:
A spendthrift trust is defined as: "A trust in which by the terms of the trust or by
statute a valid restraint on the voluntary and involuntary transfer of the interest of the
beneficiary is imposed." RESTATENMENT (SECOND) OF TIusMs § 152(2), at 311 (1959). In
contrast, a trust established and funded by the beneficiary is considered a self-settled
trust. An I.R.A. or Keogh plan is an example of a self-settled trust. See supra note 14
and accompanying text. Traditionally self-settled trusts have been considered nonspend-
thrift because they are ineffective as against creditors: "Where a person creates for his
own benefit a trust with a provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of
his interest, his transferee or creditors can reach his interest." REsTATmETr (SEcoND)
OF TRUSTS § 156(1), at 326. See also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
" These anti-alienation provisions were tested in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers
National Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1990). In Guidry the Supreme Court upheld
ERISA's anti-alienation prohibitions in a nonbankruptcy context. The court refused to
impose a constructive trust on a beneficiary's pension benefits in favor of a judgment
creditor. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
An example of a self-settled trust would include both an IRA and a Keogh plan.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text. These trusts are typically not included within
the rather narrow class of spendthrift trusts. The leading case in this area is In re Goff,
706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). Goff involved the exclusion or exemption of a Keogh trust
valued at more than $90,000, established and funded by the debtors. Three days before
filing bankruptcy the debtors deposited $2,878 into their Keogh account in an attempt to
prevent the creditors' access to the funds. The Fifth Circuit refused to exclude any part
of the account from the estate. First, it held that section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code should be construed as a narrow reference to state spendthrift trust law that does
not include ERISA and all other laws. Second, it found that the Goffs were able to exer-
cise total control over the funds, which were also self-settled. For these reasons, the Ke-
ogh trust could not qualify under state spendthrift trust law for exclusion under section
541(c)(2). Id. at 580. Although Goff involved an IRA, it also set forth clear rules for
Keogh and ERISA plans. For an example of a trust with sufficient restrictions to qualify
as spendthrift, see In re Kreiss, 72 B.R. 933 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) (trust established by
debtor's father, providing for payments to be made within sole discretion of trustee, re-
stricted debtor's rights to alienate or assign funds, and was excluded from estate under
section 541(c)(2)).
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(10) The debtor's right to receive-
(E) A payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity,
or similar plan or contract. . . to the extent reasonably necessary for
the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.38
Many courts see this Code provision to indicate Congress's in-
tent to deal with ERISA-qualified plans only through the ex-
emption process. 9 These courts reason that if all ERISA plans
were excluded through section 541(c)(2), then the statutory pro-
vision specifically exempting a debtor's pension plan would be
rendered meaningless. 40
38 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982) (emphasis added).
39 A debtor's exemptions are set forth under section 522 of the Code. Section 522
provides two basic options by which the debtor can exempt property that is included in
the estate. He or she can choose (1) the federal exemptions set forth under subsection
(d); or (2) the exemptions allowed under state law, and in addition may exempt other
property which is exempt under "other federal law." 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A).
The federal exemptions enumerated in subsection (d) permit a limited exemption
for pension benefits to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and
the debtor's dependents. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). Nevertheless, many debtors seek a
full exemption for their ERISA plan under section 522(b)(2)(A), contending that
ERISA's anti-garnishment provisions qualify as "other federal law" under which pension
plans are exempt from garnishment or attachment. See supra note 5 and accompanying
text. Should ERISA be included under section 522(b)(2)(A) as "other federal law," a
debtor could retain 100% of his or her vested interest from creditors without raising the
issue of whether ERISA constitutes applicable nonbankruptcy law under section
541(c)(2).
Most courts, though, do not interpret ERISA as "other federal law" so as to allow a
total exemption in bankruptcy because ERISA is not included in the "laundry list" of
federal exemptions contained in the House and Senate Reports to the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978. See Goff, 706 F.2d at 582-585, citing S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong. 2d
Sess. at 75 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N 5861; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d
Sess. 360 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6316. These courts reason that if the
legislative history of section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Code explicitly omits ERISA, then the
more ambiguous language of section 541(c)(2) would hardly include it by implication.
Goff, 706 F.2d at 582-86. See In re Daniel, 771 F.2d at 1361 ("The failure to mention
ERISA in the legislative history accompanying section 522(b)(2)(A) is, therefore, both
purposeful and reasoned.").
Despite the prevalence of such decisions, a growing minority of courts allow this
exemption because they see the list in the House and Senate Reports to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act as a laundry list of illustrative, not exhaustive, exceptions. These courts de-
fine ERISA as "other federal law" within the meaning of section 522(b)(2)(A), and there-
fore allow ERISA's total exemption at the debtor's option. See In re Starkey, 116 B.R.
259, 264-65 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Komet, 104 B.R. 799, 805-8 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1989). An in-depth analysis of the exemption process for ERISA plans is beyond the
scope of this Note. For an excellent discussion of whether ERISA deserves its own "fed-
eral law" exemption under the Code, see Note, Exemption of ERISA Benefits Under
Section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 83 MICH. L. REV. 214 (1984).
'0 See, e.g., In re Swanson, 873 F.2d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir. 1989) ("if section 541(c)(2)
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In addition to relying on the legislative history and other
Code provisions to limit section 541(c)(2) to spendthrift trusts,
courts supporting the inclusion of ERISA in bankruptcy estates
often compare the spirit and overall purpose of an ERISA plan
to that of a traditional spendthrift trust.4" ERISA section 206(d)
were construed to exclude retirement funds from the bankruptcy estate then [section
522(d)(10)(E)(iii)] that provides a limited federal exemption for these funds would be
rendered meaningless"); In re Graham, 726 F.2d at 1272 ("the question of pension rights
is dealt with as a matter of exemption" (emphasis added)); In re Goff, 706 F.2d at 595
(the specific reference to pension plans found in section 522(d)(10)(E)(iii) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code demonstrates that Congress did not "overlook" ERISA in the drafting of
other Code provisions); Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1982) ("an exemption for
pension benefits ... would be surplusage if the benefits were not meant to be property
of the estate"); Employee Benefits Comm. v. Tabor, 127 B.R. 194, 198 (Banhr. S.D. Ind.
1991) (Congress did not intend to exclude ERISA from the estate given the fact that
§ 522(d)(10)(E) expressly provides for a partial exemption of ERISA pension plans); In
re Kazi, 125 B.R. 981, 984 (Bankr. S.D. IML 1991) ("The Bankruptcy Code specifically
provides that pension benefits may be exempted, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E), 'clearly indi-
cating that they were intended and assumed to be part of the estate"' in In re Graham,
726 F.2d at 1272); In re McIntosh, 116 B.R. 277, 278 (Bankr. N.D. Okl. 1990) (interpret-
ing section 541(c)(2) to exclude all ERISA-qualified plans would render 11 U.S.C. §
522(d)(10)(E) meaningless; if Congress had intended to exclude all ERISA plans from
the bankruptcy estate there would have been no need for such plans to be expressly
included in the federal exemption scheme).
Some courts, however, oppose this view. Instead these courts reason that the possi-
bility of an overlap between two Code sections is perfectly permissible, and does not
flout congressional mandates regarding property of the estate. In re Majul, 119 B.R. 118,
123 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Pruitt, 30 B.R. 330, 331-332 (Bank'r. D. Colo. 1983);
In re Threewitt, 24 B.R. at 930. These courts find that any overlap between various Ccde
provisions concerning ERISA would result in either (1) the full exclusion of ERISA
plans under section 541(c)(2) by virtue of their restrictions on transfer, (2) a partial ex-
emption under section 522(d)(10)(E) as a pension plan; or (3) a full exemption under
section 522(b)(2)(A) as a separate nonbankruptcy federal exemption. In re Suarez, 127
B.R. 73, 81 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991).
" Unlike a classic spendthrift trust that prohibits alienation or control of benefits,
ERISA allows the debtor access to benefits. Under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2), the debtor
may voluntarily assign up to 10% of his or her ERISA benefit payments, and may bor-
row from the plan, so long as the loan is secured by the participant's vested interest.
Such access is, however, conditioned on the loss of favorable tax status. I.R.C. § 501(a).
Were ERISA plans true spendthrift trusts, such access would not be allowaed. The major-
ity thus views ERISA section 206(d)(1)'s prohibition against alienation as a provision
that merely "restricts or conditions transfer of" the debtor's interest based upon the
debtor's desire for favorable tax treatment. Such a clause will not preclude the inclusion
of the trust in the bankruptcy estate under section 541(c)(2). 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(A).
See In re Kazi, 125 B.R. at 985 (only true spendthrift trusts are to be excluded from the
estate under section 541(c)(2); state law that excludes ERISA plans from property of the
estate frustrates the intent underlying section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code); In re
Knowles, 123 B.R. 428 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (dominion and control exercised by
debtor over retirement plan, as opposed to spendthrift trust, is ultimate question in de-
ciding whether retirement plans should be excluded from estate); In re Smith, 115 BIR
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merely requires non-alienation and non-assignment of funds to
qualify for favorable tax treatment.42 The beneficiary retains the
power to reach the entire balance of funds.4 3 In contrast, a
spendthrift trust forbids alienation of the trust's assets under
any circumstances and distributes only a specified percent of the
trust to the beneficiary, who has no control over the remainder.44
Therefore, courts favoring a literal interpretation of section
541(c)(2) often conclude that a retirement plan will be excluded
as a traditional spendthrift trust only when there is a total ab-
sence of control by the debtor over the plan's assets. 45
144 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1990) (the power of a beneficiary to compel total distribution of the
corpus is antithetical to the nature of a spendthrift trust); In re McLean, 41 B.R. 893
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1984), rev'd, McLean v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas
Pension Fund (In re McLean), 762 F.2d 1204, 1208 (4th Cir. 1985) ("while a classic
spendthrift trust does not allow a beneficiary to transfer any portion of his interest in
the trust, ERISA specifically allows a beneficiary of a qualified pension plan to volunta-
rily assign up to ten percent of any benefit payment").
42 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (West Supp. 1991). See supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
tt Concededly, an ERISA-qualified plan must contain a provision prohibiting aliena-
tion or assignment of benefits to qualify for favorable tax treatment. However, the plan
may also contain different conditions under which the beneficiary is permitted to reach
his or her vested interest. Most retirement plans either include a borrowing provision
requiring payback of any loans from the plan, or require a showing of hardship, or
threatened loss of tax benefits, for the beneficiary to reach the funds prematurely. All of
these conditions, although restrictive, still allow the debtor access to the funds. See Goff,
706 F.2d at 585; supra note 30 and accompanying text.
44 The Goff court defined a spendthrift trust as:
a trust created to provide a fund for the maintenance of a beneficiary, with
only a certain portion of the total amount to be distributed at any one time.
The settlor places "spendthrift" restrictions on the trust, which operate in
most states to place the fund beyond the reach of the beneficiary's creditors, as
well as to secure the fund against the beneficiary's own improvidence.
706 F.2d at 580.
41 The ability of a debtor to reach his or her entire interest in a retirement plan has
been cited most often as the dispositive factor in classifying the plan-whether as an
ERISA plan or not. A line of cases has developed espousing this stricter view: In re
Jordan, 914 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1990) (trust containing restrictions against assignment
and alienation, created to compensate debtor for personal injury claim, was considered
self-settled by debtor's consent to trust's creation, and therefore could not be considered
spendthrift trust under state law); In re Swanson, 873 F.2d at 1124 (statutory restric-
tions on a Teachers' Retirement Fund did not qualify fund as a traditional spendthrift
trust under Minnesota law despite restrictive language akin to that found in most spend-
thrift trusts); In re Graham, 726 F.2d at 1272; In re Silldorff, 96 B.R. at 859 (debtor's
ability to quit job and receive lump sum distribution from pension plan constituted suffi-
cient control to disqualify plan as spendthrift trust under Illinois law); In re Ridenour,
45 B.R. 72, 78 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984) (legislative history of § 541(c)(2) mandates a
narrow reading of the statute to exclude only those ERISA-qualified pension plans that
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Some recent appellate decisions, however, suggest that this
view may be too narrow. While accepting the majority view that
Congress had spendthrift trusts in mind when promulgating sec-
tion 541(c)(2), these courts have examined a particular plan or
trust to determine whether it qualifies as a "non-traditional"
spendthrift trust under nonbankruptcy law.40 Courts favoring
this more lenient interpretation have excluded ERISA plans
from bankruptcy estates, so long as access to debtors is severely
limited.47
The Ninth Circuit recently espoused this more flexible in-
terpretation of an ERISA plan in In re Kincaid.'5 In Kincaid
the debtor had an interest in a 401(k) deferred salary plan in
which she voluntarily chose to participate. 0 Contributions to the
plan were made by both the debtor and her employer50 At the
time of bankruptcy, the debtor claimed an exemption in her
ERISA plan and the bankruptcy court sustained an objection by
the trustee. The plan administrator, however, subsequently de-
nied a request to turn over the funds to the trustee."' The bank-
constitute valid spendthrift trusts under state law).
46 In re Goff, 706 F.2d at 587. Goff interpreted section 541(c)(2) as referring to
traditional state spendthrift trusts only. However, the Keogh plan at issue in that case
could still have qualified for exclusion from the estate if it fell within the spendthrift
trust definition provided by state law. See also In re McIntosh, 116 B.R. at 273; In re
Starkey, 116 B.R. at 262.
4 The ability of an individual debtor to gain access to a trust has been cited most
often as the key factor in classifying the plan, whether ERISA-qualified or not. Morter v.
Farm Credit Servs., 937 F.2d 354, 357-358 (7th Cir. 1991); In re Knowles, 123 B.R. 428
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
48 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990).
49 The IR.C. provides favorable tax treatment for funds deposited in trusts that are
subject to certain specified restrictions on alienation or withdrawal. 26 U.S.C. §§
401(a)(13), (k).
10 Contributions to the plan were made in three ways: a 2o reduction in employee
compensation, supplemental amounts contributed by the employee and a specified
matching amount donated by the employer that could equal up to 50% of the reduction
in employee compensation. Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1164.
51 -The plan administrator argued that the Plan was not property of the estate, rely-
ing on the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of ERISA's preemptive provisions. Id.
at 1166, citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). In Pilot Life the Su-
preme Court held that ERISA's preemptive provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), should be
construed broadly to preempt "any and all state lazs" relating to ERISA plans. 481 US.
at'41. Under this construction, ERISA superseded all state laws that would otherwise
subject a qualified plan to inclusion in the bankruptcy estate. In Kincaid the plan ad-
ministrator refused the turnover request, arguing that state spendthrift law also related
to ERISA and was therefore preempted. He contended that an ERISA-governed plan
could not be subject to the requirements of state spendthrift law to determine whether
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ruptcy court ruled in favor of the trustee and the bankruptcy
appellate panel affirmed.52  The panel held that the plan's anti-
alienation provisions alone did not qualify the plan as a spend-
thrift trust because the debtor was allowed access to the funds
under certain conditions.53 Moreover, because the plan was par-
tially funded by the debtor's voluntary contributions, the court
held it to be self-settled in nature. Therefore, the court held that
the plan could not qualify for spendthrift status under applica-
ble nonbankruptcy law. 4
The Ninth Circuit disagreed.5 5 Recognizing the conflict be-
tween ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code,55 the court opted to
the debtor's interest entered the estate because that very law was preempted and invali-
dated by virtue of ERISA. Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1166.
2 In re Kincaid, 96 B.R. 1014, 1016 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989).
53 Kincaid was allowed to reach the corpus of the trust upon retirement, attainment
of age 592, disability, death or termination of service. Withdrawals could be made only
upon a showing of hardship that the Plan defined as "immediate and heavy financial
need ... of a Participant or his dependents." Id. at 1015-16.
51 Self-settled trusts are not considered spendthrift trusts. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1163.
5' The court noted an incongruous result in the following: before bankruptcy,
ERISA's anti-alienation provisions protect a debtor's interest in a retirement plan. Gui-
dry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1990). However, the re-
strictions accompanying other types of self-settled trusts, such as IRAs and Keogh plans,
do not offer such absolute protection against garnishment or transfer. See supra note 14
and accompanying text. In contrast, only state spendthrift law will protect debtors both
before and in bankruptcy. Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1166; 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). Under such
circumstances, protection of ERISA plans would depend upon whether the plan could
qualify under the spendthrift trust law of individual states. For example, two debtors
live on opposite sides of a state line and work for the same employer. Both participate in
the same ERISA-qualified plan. Both file Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions in their respec-
tive districts. One state recognizes and enforces the restrictions on spendthrift trusts as
against creditors. The other state neither recognizes nor protects spendthrift trusts. The
debtor domiciled in the first state will be entitled to preserve her interest in bankruptcy;
the debtor domiciled in the second state will be afforded no protection for her interest
under state law, ERISA or the Bankruptcy Code. Such unequal treatment of identical
property would be in contravention to the goals of the Bankruptcy Code, and would
oppose the constitutional grant of power to Congress to establish uniform laws on bank-
ruptcy. U.S. CONsT. art. I § 8, cl. 4. Moreover, this result also weakens the effect of
ERISA's state preemptive provisions that were enacted to ensure national uniformity
with respect to pension rights and obligations. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,
482 U.S. 1 (1987); 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a), note 2 supra.
An alternative view to the above quandary is found in the Code itself. When the
bankruptcy estate is created, the Bankruptcy Code explicitly looks to state law to deter-
mine the debtor's interest in property. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Accordingly, if state spend-
thrift law in one jurisdiction differs in its definition of a spendthrift trust from another
jurisdiction, the Code must respect each definition in bankruptcy.
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examine the nature of the plan and its restrictions, rather than
draw a line at the debtor's voluntary participation and contribu-
tions. The issue, according to the Ninth Circuit, was whether the
plan could meet the standard of a spendthrift trust. The thresh-
old inquiry, therefore, was whether the trust was self-settled. 7
.The court held that the ERISA plan was not self-settled,
despite both the debtor's voluntary participation and prior case
law to the contrary.58 Noting the plan's restrictions, the court
observed that "the employee does not have the right to the
funds contributed to the Plan at any time prior to their contri-
bution . . . .Moreover, the amount contributed never belongs
to the employee . . . Therefore, the trust was not self-set-
tled. '59 The debtor's access was also severely limited once the
funds were contributed. The plan allowed distribution of a par-
ticipant's interest only upon death, attainment of age 591/2, disa-
bility, retirement or termination of employment.10
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that some courts, mindful
of debtors' interests in sheltering assets from creditors, find that
any voluntary action by a debtor to gain access to a trust, in-
cluding leaving one's employment, destroys the spendthrift char-
acter of the trust.6 ' But the court declined to follow this inter-
pretation. It found the ramifications of having to leave one's job
'7 Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1167.
58 The Ninth Circuit had previously considered this issue in In re Daniel, 771 F.2d
1352, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). In Daniel the court held
that "the phrase 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' in 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) was intended to
be a narrow reference to state 'spendthrift' trust law and not a broad reference to all
other laws, including ERISA and IRC, which prohibit alienation." Daniel, 771 F.2d at
1360 (emphasis in original).
89 Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1167.
6Id. The court also considered the fact that Kincaid's only access to the funds was
under the loan or hardship provisions, and even this access was solely within the discre-
tion of the plan administrator. Therefore, she was able to exercise very little, if any,
dominion or control over the trust, including the extent of her owru contributions. Id. at
1168. See also In re Bartlett, 116 B.R. 1015, 1020 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990) (plan's restric-
tions that rendered debtor unable to demand any distribution of her interest qualified
the plan as a spendthrift trust under state law.).
61 When an employee participates in an employer-sponsored retirement plan, the
funds can be reached upon the termination of the employer-employee relationship (for
example, upon the debtor's retirement or resignation). The contributions previously
made to the fund by the employee may now be fully withdrawn. Because there is some
way the debtor can gain full and unrestricted access to his vested interest-even if the
debtor does not intend to do so-bankruptcy courts have considered such plans self-
settled and subject to the beneficiary's control Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1168 (citing In re
Silldorff, 96 B.R. 859, 863 (Bankr. C.D. IMI. 1989)).
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to gain access to retirement funds sufficient to deter abuse by
debtors seeking to shield assets through the bankruptcy pro-
cess. 2 Thus, since the plan sufficiently restricted the debtor's
control to make it akin to a spendthrift trust, the court excluded
the plan's funds from the bankruptcy estate."
In many ways, the Kincaid analysis clearly produces an eq-
uitable result. The debtor's interest is placed beyond the reach
of her creditors by the same restrictions that placed it beyond
the reach of the debtor. Dishonest debtors are prevented from
excluding the bulk of their assets from the reach of creditors by
placing restrictions on their transfer while the debtors them-
selves continue to exercise total dominion and control.6 4 At the
62 The court mused that even debtors intending to shelter assets through their re-
tirement plans would not quit their jobs to do so since this would be a "rather drastic
step" to take. Id. at 1168.
03 Id. The Seventh Circuit is of the same opinion as the Ninth Circuit. In In re
LeFeber, 906 F.2d 330, 331 (7th Cir. 1990),-decided three months before Kincaid, the
Seventh Circuit excluded a debtor's pension plan under section 541(c)(2) as a spendthrift
trust. The debtor received a $1,000 monthly payment from an ERISA-qualified pension
plan that contained restrictions in compliance with 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d). These limita-
tions barred him from assigning the right to receive benefits. However, an exception per-
mitted him to make a revocable assignment of 10% of his benefits. The plan's absolute
restriction on 90% of the pension benefits clearly fell within section 541(c)(2). The more
difficult question was whether the debtor's ability to assign the remaining 10% of his
benefits destroyed the spendthrift aspect of the trust. The Seventh Circuit held that "a
revocable assignment is no better than no assignment at all," and therefore the debtor
really had no right to assign or otherwise alienate his own pension benefits. Id. Indiana
spendthrift law, therefore, applied to the benefits, and the debtor's monthly payments
were excluded from the estate. Id. See also In re Bartlett, 116 B.R. 1015 (Bankr. S.D.
Iowa 1990) (debtor's retirement plan excluded as a spendthrift trust under section
541(c)(2) because restrictions could impose up to 25 year wait for debtor's interest to be
turned over to trustee).
" This type of abuse has become more prevalent in recent years as the level of
debtor sophistication grows. Wealthy professionals with substantial incomes form profes-
sional corporations and establish retirement plans for themselves that contain restrictive
provisions. They subsequently file bankruptcy petitions to discharge debts incurred
through business ventures, while at the same time sheltering the bulk of their assets in
pension plans, IRAs and Keogh accounts. These debtors then claim that the funds are
not property of the bankruptcy estate because the Code enforces the restrictions on
transfer that the debtor imposed upon his own interest. Bankruptcy courts will seldom
allow this, however. One of the leading cases in this area is In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th
Cir. 1983), supra note 37. Other examples of attempts at excluding a self-settled fund
posing as a retirement plan are In re Vels, 109 B.R. 64 (D.N.J. 1991), afl'd in part, rev'd
in part sub nom, Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991), and In re White, 61 B.R.
388 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1986). For an analysis of this topic, see Charles R. Sterbach, et
al., Pre-Bankruptcy Planning for Professionals and ERISA Qualified Pension Plans:
Are State Created Statutory Exemptions D.O.A. in Bankruptcy Proceedings?, 94 Co.
L. J. 229 (1989).
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same time, this interpretation does not penalize honest debtors
who stumble into bankruptcy, by allowing their retirement
funds to become fair game for creditors.6 5
B. The Minority View
A minority of courts have excluded ERISA-qualified pen-
sion plans from a debtor's bankruptcy estate. These courts hold
that section 541(c)(2)'s reference to "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" includes ERISA, thereby excluding any and all ERISA pen-
sions by virtue of the restrictions on their transfer.00 Rather
A debtor may still opt to exempt his or her retirement interest under section
522(d)(10)(E) of the Code-an alternative that the Kincaid court failed to consider. 11
U.S.C. § 522 (d)(10)(E). This provision allows the debtor whose pension is included in
the estate to retain an amount reasonably necessary for his or her support and for the
support of dependents while, at the same time, permitting creditors to get at any excess
funds in the debtor's pension fund, and thus a few more cents on the dollar. The "rea-
sonably necessary" exemption is built into the Code through section 522 (d)(10)(E). See
supra note 39 and accompanying text. Had the Kincaid plan been included in the bank-
ruptcy estate, the debtors would still have had the option of utilizing this limited exemp-
tion. For an excellent example of the way courts interpret the "reasonably necessary"
standard, compare In re Donaghy, 11 B.R. 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (taking into ac-
count the special needs of elderly and infirm debtors) with In re Taft, 10 B.R. 101
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) ("reasonably necessary" standard requires court to take into ac-
count debtor's basic needs, not related to his or her former status in society or the lifes-
tyle to which the debtor was accustomed prior to bankruptcy.) But see In re McGoy, 86
B.R. 174, 176 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988) (debtor's claimed exemption for stock bonus pay-
ments, received prior to bankruptcy, was not allowed; debtor's "right to receive" pay-
ment was extinguished at time of payment prior to bankruptcy; distinguishing and limit-
ing Donaghy to its facts).
A debtor who resides in an opt-out state, however, will not have the option of choos-
ing the section 522(d) exemptions. Instead, these debtors must rely on the exemptions
provided by their own states for debtors in bankruptcy. The granting to states of the
right to "opt-out" of the federal exemption scheme has been subject to constitutional
attacks, but has been upheld. In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 992 (1982). For a closer look at the plight faced by debtors in opt-out states that do
not recognize the section 522 exemptions, see Sterbach, supra note 64, at 250-51.
The Kincaid court further suggested that ERISA-qualified plans still deserve
greater protection in bankruptcy- the mere opportunity to meet the requirements of
state spendthrift law is simply not enough. Judge Fletcher's thoughtful concurrence
found it "unthinkable that Congress intended to eviscerate in this manner so much of
the protection granted benefit plans under ERISA." Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1170. Instead,
she viewed the ERISA-mandated restrictions as sufficient by themselves to exclude the
debtor's interest from the estate. Id. at 1167. The concurrence would reject the Ninth
Circuit's prior opinion in Daniel, that limited applicable nonbankruptcy law to state
spendthrift trust law only, and would adopt the view espoused in In re Moore, 907 F.2d
1476 (4th Cir. 1990), infra note 72.
The following cases have held that the anti-alienation and anti-garnishment pro-
visions of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), are enforceable in bankruptcy. Forbes v. Holiday
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than resort to legislative history, courts adopting this position
rely on section 541(c)(2)'s plain language, holding that it unam-
biguously includes "all laws, state and federal, under which a
transfer restriction is enforceable. 6 7
The Fourth Circuit recently expressed this view in In re
Moore. s The debtors in Moore participated in an ERISA-quali-
fled pension and profit-sharing plan maintained by their em-
ployer. The trustee for the bankruptcy estate brought suit
against the plan administrator to compel him to turn over the
debtors' interests in the plan as assets of the estate. The trustee
argued that since the plan was not a spendthrift trust under
governing state law, the debtors' interests were part of the bank-
ruptcy estate."' Both the bankruptcy court and the district court
held that ERISA's restrictions on transfer were enforceable in
bankruptcy and therefore were not subject to inclusion in the
Corp. Say. & Ret. Plan, 111 S.Ct. 2275 (1991); Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir.
1991); Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Lucas, 924 F.2d 597 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied sub noma., Forbes v. Holiday Corp. Say. & Ret. Plan, 111 S.Ct 2275
(1991); In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Wyles, 123 B.R. 733 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1991); In re IdaIski, 123 B.R. 222 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991); In re Cheaver, 121
B.R. 665 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1990); In re Majul, 119 B.R. 118 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re
Pruitt, 30 B.R. 330 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re Threewitt, 24 B.R. 927 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1982).
"' The Sixth Circuit recently held that section 541(c)(2) is clear and unambiguous,
and includes "all laws, state and federal." In re Lucas, 924 F.2d at 601 (citing Moore, 907
F.2d at 1477). This includes the entire federal statutory scheme of ERISA. This notion
was expressed much earlier in In re Pruitt: "When a statute is clear on its face there is
no need to resort to legislative history." 30 B.R. at 331.
"8 In re Moore, 907 F.2d at 1476. The Sixth Circuit's decision in In re Lucas is more
recent. Lucas involved a debtor's $2,000 vested interest in an employer-sponsored retire-
ment account qualified under I.R.C. sections 401(a) and (k). The debtor claimed the
funds exempt based on their ERISA qualifications. The bankruptcy and district courts
held that the section 541(c)(2) exclusion applied to spendthrift trusts only, and because
it was conceded that the debtor's plan was not such a trust, it was included in the estate.
The Sixth Circuit reversed, relying on Moore, and rejected the majority view that relied
on legislative history to reach a narrow view of section 541(c)(2). In re Lucas, 924 F.2d at
601. See also Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362, 365 (4th Cir. 1991).
Although both Lucas and Shumate are more recent opinions, this Note will analyze
Moore, since the Lucas and Shumate courts rely heavily on Moore for their holdings. In
addition, the Third Circuit has now adopted the minority view. In Velis v. Kardanis, 949
F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1991), the court held that qualified pension and Keogh plans and
IRAs may be excluded from the bankruptcy estate. This holding reversed bankruptcy
and district court decisions that specifically included such plans in the debtor's estate.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
69 Because the Plan was governed by the laws of South Carolina, it had to meet the
requirements of South Carolina spendthrift trust law. In re Moore, 907 F.2d at 1477.
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estate.70
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the language of
section 541(c)(2) is plain and unambiguous: it excludes all bene-
ficial interests of the debtor subject to a restriction that is en-
forceable outside of bankruptcy.71 Such plain and unambiguous
statutory language made resort to legislative history "inappro-
priate. 72 Moreover, even if the legislative history were con-
sulted, it would be inconclusive. The court found that although
the United States House and Senate Reports referred to spend-
thrift trust restrictions as preserved under the Bantruptcy
Code, they merely suggested that Congress intended to include
state spendthrift restrictions within the statute.73 There was no
further evidence that Congress intended such a reference in the
legislative history to mean that "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
was exclusively limited to state spendthrift law .7
After interpreting the statute broadly to include ERISA, the
court next considered the ERISA-mandated restrictions on
transfer to determine whether they were enforceable outside of
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 The Moore court held that "the language of section 541(c)(2) is clear," and there-
fore the legislative history was "irrelevant" and any reference to it was considered "inap-
propriate." Id. at 1478. Further, even if the legislative history were relevant, the court
noted that Congress enacted only the language found in section 541(c)(2) itself, exclusive
of any accompanying legislative reports. No authority was vested in the court by virtue
of the above language to limit a clear statute "by recourse to the views of a legislative
subgroup." Id. at 1479.
7' The House Report states that section 541(c) (2) "preserves restrictions on transfer
of a spendthrift trust to the extent that the restriction is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law." HR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 369 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C-.N 5963, 6325. The Senate Report uses identical language. See S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5787, 5S69.
74 In re Moore, 907 F.2d at 1478, 1479. The court viewed the majority's construction
of section 541(c)(2) as narrow and inconsistent, since the phrase "applicable nonban-
kruptcy law" was given a broader interpretation in numerous other sections of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Because the Code was enacted as a single comprehensive statutory scheme,
it would be "incongruous to give the same phrase in section 541(c)(2) a narrower con-
struction than the identical phrase in other parts of the Bankruptcy Code." Moreover,
"[i]f Congress had intended section 541(c)(2) to only apply to state spendthrift trusts,
the term 'spendthrift trust' would have appeared in the statute, rather than the phrase
'applicable nonbankruptcy law'." Id. (citing In re Ralstin, 61 B.R. 502, 503 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1986)).
In addition, Moore was not the first instance in which the Fourth Circuit had con-
sidered this issue. See McLean v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund, 762 F.2d 1204, 1207 n.1 (4th Cir. 1985)(declining to apply a restrictive interpreta-
tion of section 541(c)(2) as well).
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bankruptcy. The anti-alienation and anti-assignment provi-
sionS75 of the plan clearly prevented general creditors and debt-
ors from reaching the body of the trust. ERISA therefore consti-
tuted the "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under which
restrictions on the transfer of pension interests may be
enforced. 6
To support its above analysis, the court then turned to the
policy rationale of ERISA, noting that one of Congress's main
purposes in enacting the statute was to ensure the uniform
treatment of pension benefits throughout the country." If such
benefits were not uniformly protected in bankruptcy, a state
that did not protect or even recognize spendthrift trusts could
nullify ERISA's anti-alienation provisions-a result that clearly
goes against ERISA's preemptive thrust.78 Moreover, the aliena-
tion of ERISA benefits, even for the purpose of turnover to a
bankruptcy trustee, threatened the loss of the favorable tax sta-
tus accorded trusts satisfying I.R.C. mandates. 9 Such a result
could have serious and far-reaching consequences. Should an
75 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d)(1), (2). See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
7' In re Moore, 907 F.2d at 1480. Courts that have adopted the minority view ac-
knowledge the majority view that section 522(d)(10)(E)'s specific exemption for pension
plans mandates ERISA's inclusion in the bankruptcy estate. The minority argues, how-
ever, that the mere existence of an overlap between those trusts included in section
541(c)(2) and those included in section 522(d)(10)(E) was not indicative of any intent to
include ERISA in the estate. Rather, such an overlap was perfectly permissible. In draft-
ing a statutory scheme with many separate provisions like the Bankruptcy Code, Con-
gress could not be expected to account for every overlap. McLean v. Central States,
Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (In re McLean), 762 F.2d 1204, 1208 (4th
Cir. 1985), rev'g In re McLean, 41 B.R. 893 (D.S.C. 1984) (construing section 541(c)(2) to
exclude pension interests from estate property does not undercut exemption provision of
section 522(d)(10)(E)); In re Idalski, 123 B.R. 222, 231 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991) (noth-
ing remarkable about section 522(d)'s exemption of pension plans would include plans
already excluded from the estate under section 541(c)(2)); In re Majul, 119 B.R. 118, 123
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (the alleged inconsistency found in the overlap between section
541(c)(2) and section 522(d)(10)(E) was "not a valid basis to conclude that Congress
intended to include self-settled ERISA pension benefits in the bankruptcy estate").
'7 "ERISA was designed to ensure that substantive pension benefits not be subject
to the vagaries of state law." In re Moore, 907 F.2d at 1480 (citing PPG Indus. Pension
Plan A v. Crews, 902 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1990)).
78 Further support for enforcing ERISA's anti-alienation provisions is provided by
the recent Supreme court decision in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Pension Fund, 493
U.S. 365 (1990). In addition, Ellis National Bank of Jacksonville v. Irving Trust Co., 786
F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1986), supports the Supreme Court's later view in Guidry that the anti-
alienation provision of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) is not to be disturbed, regardless of the sur-
rounding circumstances. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
11 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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ERISA plan lose its tax-free status by virtue of one participant's
bankruptcy, innocent pension beneficiaries as well as the debtor
could be penalized, again in contravention of the policies under-
lying ERISA.8 0
C. A Critique of the Minority View
Despite the fact that Moore concerns a bankruptcy proceed-
ing, the statutory analysis espoused by the Moore court centers
around ERISA's nonbankruptcy policy considerations. Much of
the authority cited by the court concerns the garnishment of
ERISA-qualified benefits by a commercial or third-party credi-
tor, rather than a bankruptcy creditor."" These cases do not refer
- The LR.C. requires that all plans or trusts contain anti-alienation and anti-gar-
nishment provisions to qualify for certain tax exempt status. LR.C. § 401(a)(13). Plans
that contain these provisions will be exempt from taxation. The alienation of ERISA
benefits, even for the purpose of transferring funds to a bankruptcy trustee, could jeop-
ardize the tax status of the entire plan. The loss of exempt status could result in the
imposition of tax liability upon all participants, including innocent pension beneficiaries.
Furthermore, plan administrators could be placed in the awkward position of having to
choose between tax disqualification of an entire plan, and the imposition of sanctions for
defying a bankruptcy court order for turnover. N.Y.S. Bar Association, Report No. 140,
Approval of Bill introduced by Senator Dale M. Volker to amend C.P.L.R. § 5205(c)(d),
April 13, 1989.
Moreover, the elimination of tax incentives may result in a decrease in ERISA par-
ticipation throughout the country. In re Lucas, 924 F.2d 597, 603 (6th Cir. 1991); In re
Moore, 907 F.2d at 1480-81; McLean v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204, 1206 (4th Cir. 1985); In re Majul, 119 B.R. 118, 124
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Komet, 104 B.R. 799, 805 n.10 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
Congress specifically sought to prevent such a result by enacting both the anti-alienation
and anti-garnishment provisions found in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056 (d)(1), (2), ERISA § 206(d),
and the preemptive provisions found in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) ERISA § 514(a). HR Rs'.
No. 533, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4640, 4671, 4676.
Several courts have rejected this argument as a basis for the exclusion of ERISA
benefits. Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1982) (Bankruptcy Code's inclusion of
all debtor's property in the estate necessarily amended LR.C. section 401(a)(13), result-
ing in no loss of tax status by virtue of turnover to a bankruptcy trustee); Employee
Benefits Comm. v. Tabor, 127 B.R. 194, 201 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (potential loss of tax-ex-
empt status is insufficient to shift the balance in the debtor-beneficiary's favor); In re
Balay, 113 B.R. 429, 443 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1990) (court not persuaded by debtor's argu-
ments that tax qualified status will be jeopardized by including ERISA in estate); In re
DePiazza, 29 B.R. 916, 923 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) (refusing to recognize an IRS Private
Letter ruling that an order to turnover benefits to a trustee would result in plan's dis-
qualification under LR.C. section 401(a)(13), instead holding that favorable tax treat-
ment would still be derived even when ERISA benefits included in estate).
"1 Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987). In Moore the court cites
Smith v. Mirman, 749 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1984); General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d
455 (6th Cir. 1980); and Tenneco, Inc. v. First Virginia Bank of Tidewater, 698 F.2d 688
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to the treatment of ERISA under the Code. 2 Thus the Moore
holding ignores the effect of federal bankruptcy law on other
provisions of ERISA, notably section 514(d).
Section 514(d) is the preemptive provision of ERISA which
provides that ERISA may not supersede any other federal
laws. 3 As a result, where conflict exists between ERISA and fed-
eral bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Code must prevail.8 4 If the
Code's policy of enlarging and preserving a debtor's estate for
the benefit of creditors clashes with ERISA's policy of protecting
pension benefits,85 ERISA itself mandates that it must yield to
(4th Cir. 1983). Each of these cases enforced ERISA's restrictions on assignment and
alienation of benefits in a nonbankruptcy setting. Accordingly, these courts addressed
the effect of ERISA's preemptive provision on a creditor's state law rights only. 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a). The effect of ERISA on the operation of federal law, such as parties
asserting a right to payment in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, was not
considered.
82 The Supreme Court's enforcement of the anti-alienation provisions found in
ERISA in favor of a dishonest pension beneficiary also took place within a nonban-
kruptcy setting. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1990).
83 "Nothing in [ERISA] shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, im-
pair, or supersede any law of the United States . . .or any rule or regulation issued
under any such law." ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1991)(emphasis added).
8, "The policy of enlarging the bankruptcy estate to the maximum extent allowable
under the Code is of paramount importance ..... In re Swanson, 873 F.2d 1121, 1124
(8th Cir. 1989). The Fifth Circuit also made this clear: "If a distinction is created by
operation of bankruptcy law, which might conflict with ERISA, bankruptcy law
prevails." In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 589 (5th Cir. 1983).
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of legislative history to indicate congressional intent
regarding the conflict between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code. The House and Senate
Reports accompanying the 1974 enactment of ERISA refer only to ERISA's non-preemp-
tion of other federal laws. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d). These reports could not make explicit
reference to the Bankruptcy Code as the Code itself did not exist until 1978, four years
later.
The Bankruptcy Code likewise contains no legislative history that speaks to the
treatment of ERISA. Although the federal pension scheme was well known, Congress
made no reference to it in drafting the Code, nor does the legislative history contain
reference to ERISA, despite the specific mention of spendthrift trusts in the legislative
history to section 541(c)(2). See supra notes 34, 40-41 and accompanying text. However,
there may well have been no need for Congress to indicate ERISA's relationship to fed-
eral bankruptcy law at that time. The conflict between the two federal statutory schemes
had not yet arisen, and could not have arisen, until after the Code's enactment. Indeed,
the Code created the conflict-albeit unintentionally.
This Note takes the position that the failure of Congress to mention ERISA in the
legislative history to the Code, while explicitly referring to "pensions" in the exemptions
section, is dispositive. Congress intended to include ERISA in the estate, and to mandate
that ERISA yield to the Bankruptcy Code. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
85 "This is not primarily a debtor's bill, however. The bill codifies creditors' rights
more clearly than the case law, which is in many ways just developing. It defines the
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the Bankruptcy Code.86
Finally, the minority view makes no provision for dishonest
debtors who, despite substantial income, seek to shelter assets
from their creditors through ERISA-qualified retirement plans.
The minority would allow total exclusion of pension plans,
merely because they are ERISA-qualified, by debtors who exer-
cise so much control over these plans that the restrictions placed
upon them to qualify under ERISA are meaningless. A recent
and unfortunate repercussion of the Moore legacy is seen in In
re Wyles. 7
In Wyles the bankruptcy court faced the situation of a
debtor who exercised unlimited control over a pension and profit
sharing plan established by a corporation under his sole control.
The debtor's vested interest totalled over $945,000. Under
Moore the court was forced to enjoin the trustee from making
any distribution from the plan, including to the creditors and
the debtor himself, until the debtor would have had that right
according to terms of the plan itself. This ruling resulted in the
sheltering of nearly one million dollars from general creditors to
the extent that ERISA's restrictions-imposed and amended by
the debtor himself-prevented the creditor from reaching the
funds.8
The Fourth Circuit's subsequent decision in Shumate u.
Patterson is equally disturbing.8 9 In Shumate the debtor was
the president and chairman of the board of his employer, and
protections to which a secured creditor is entitled, and the means through which the
court may grant that protection." HR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. 5 (1978), re-
printed in 1978 US.C.CA.N. 5966. See also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
86 A bankruptcy case is governed exclusively by federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a).
Therefore, all bankruptcy proceedings should trigger 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) of ERISA,
which mandates that ERISA may not invalidate or supersede other federal laws. Thus,
any ERISA provisions that could be construed as opposing federal bankruptcy law must
yield to it. See In re Swanson, 873 F.2d at 1124 ("We interpret § 541(c)(2) narrowly
because a broad meaning would run afoul of the policies sought to be furthered through
the Bankruptcy Code."); and In re Goff, 706 F.2d at 589 (if the operation of bankruptcy
law conflicts with ERISA, bankruptcy law prevails). Of course, the mere existence of
bankruptcy law does not affect the administration of ERISA as an entire federal statu-
tory scheme. So long as ERISA's provisions do not supersede the Bankruptcy Code, the
two federal laws can coexist.
8 123 B.&. 733 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991).
" These restrictions on distribution would last until the debtor reached the age of
592 years. Id. at 736.
89 943 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1991).
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controlled 96% of the voting stock. His vested interest in an
ERISA-qualified retirement plan consisted solely of employer
contributions valued at $250,000. He claimed that the plan was
exempt and thus protected solely by virtue of ERISA. The dis-
trict court held that "Shumate's control over the pension plan
was so complete as not to qualify the pension plan for spend-
thrift status" under state law.90 Hence, the plan was included in
the estate. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed. Citing Moore,
the Fourth Circuit held that "the status of the plan as ERISA-
qualified" excluded the debtor's interest from the bankruptcy
estate.'
The blanket exclusion of all ERISA plans without further
regard to individual circumstances may work an injustice to
creditors and encourage abusive filings. The results in Moore,
Wyles and Shumate, obtained by respecting ERISA's anti-alien-
ation provisions in bankruptcy, also contravene the Bankruptcy
Code's policy of enlarging the estate and treating creditors
fairly9 2-results that Congress neither anticipated nor desired
when enacting ERISA. 93 Thus, the minority view seeks to pre-
serve congressional intent with regard to the protection of
ERISA plans while concurrently disregarding congressional in-
tent concerning the Bankruptcy Code.
90 Id. at 363.
9' Id. at 365.
92 The Bankruptcy Code defines the property of the estate as "all legal and equita-
ble interests of the debtor" at the moment of bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (emphasis
added). Congress intended this Code provision to be construed broadly. See supra note
28 and accompanying text. Hence, a broad reading of section 541(c)(2) to include ERISA
would oppose the goals of the Bankruptcy Code to enlarge the estate to the maximum
extent allowed. In re Swanson, 873 F.2d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir. 1989).
In addition, Congress recognized that one of the main purposes of the Bankruptcy
Act was to "assemble and liquidate [the debtor's] assets for distribution to creditors,"
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5963,
5971.
92 The minority would allow ERISA's provisions to restrict the Bankruptcy Code's
ability to enlarge the estate through the inclusion of pension and retirement benefits in
order to repay creditors. Under this view, ERISA section 514(d) is again violated because
ERISA is being administered in opposition to the Code. Finally, the minority fails to
address the fact that Congress enacted the 1978 Bankruptcy Code four years after the
1974 enactment of ERISA. If a specific exclusion or federal exemption were intended for
ERISA benefits, Congress could have easily so provided without the necessity of legisla-
tive inquiry.
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H. THE SPENDTHRIFT PRESUMPTION IN NEW YORK
The inclusion of retirement and pension benefits in the
bankruptcy estate has sparked controversy, even among those
states that adhere to the majority view. First, this view strips
debtors of their pensions merely because they sought the refuge
of bankruptcy court.94 More importantly, the majority view may
penalize honest debtors by discouraging them from seeking the
"fresh start" promised by the Code. 5 Nevertheless, with some
notable exceptions, state bankruptcy courts have obediently fol-
lowed higher courts' holdings that ERISA funds must be in-
cluded in the bankruptcy estate.96
A few states, however, have reacted more aggressively.
Rather than adhere to the strict majority view, they have in-
stead opted to exclude retirement plans from the bankruptcy es-
It is important to remember that under the majority view, once an individual files
a petition in bankruptcy court, his or her pension will be subject to the claims of credi-
tors. But if the same debtor declined to file bankruptcy, and instead allowed creditors to
pursue him or her via state law remedies, the pension benefits would be protected from a
garnishment proceeding by ERISA's anti-assignment provision. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1990).
15 Penalizing honest debtors who seek the safe harbor of the federal bankruptcy
laws as a refuge from creditors and collection agencies contravenes the Bankruptcy
Codes policy of providing a safe haven for debtors seeking a fresh start. See supra note
28 and accompanying text. However, such concern is speculative. There is no evidence
that debtors have been discouraged from filing bankruptcy petitions since In re Goff first
enunciated the majority view in 1983. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). To the contrary,
personal bankruptcy filings totalled 457,240, or 71%, of all bankruptcy petitions filed in
1989. This Note takes the position that those debtors who are discouraged from seeking
the protection of federal bankruptcy court solely because their pensions will be deemed
property of the estate may well have their good faith questioned.
" One such court that disagreed with the binding majority view was In re Brown,
130 B.R. 304 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991):
[T]his Court is compelled to follow established precedent and hold that the
phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" contained in Section 541(c)(2) applies
only to state spendthrift trust law and does not include ERISA .... This
Court encourages the Eighth Circuit to reexamine its position on this issue
based on the Lucas and Moore decisions.
Id. at 307-08 n.6.
Some lower courts, however, have felt so strongly about this issue that they have
refused to include ERISA plans in the bankruptcy estate despite binding circuit court
decisions to the contrary. See In re Suarez, 127 B.R. 73, 81 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) (hold-
ing ERISA to be applicable nonbankruptcy law and excluded under section 541(c)(2), or
exempt under section 522(b)(2)(A) as other federal law); In re Majul, 119 B.R. 118
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) and In re Komet, 104 B.R. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1939) (hold-
ing that ERISA-qualified pension plans are exempt from the bankruptcy estate despite
the contrary view of the Fifth Circuit in In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983)).
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tate by enacting legislation specifically designed to protect
ERISA-qualified and other types of employee benefit plans.97
These states have chosen to protect a debtor's interest in a ben-
efit plan-whether spendthrift or not-by labeling certain types
of trusts or retirement plans "spendthrift." Bankruptcy courts
adhering to the majority view are thereby forced to exclude ben-
efit plans from the estate when interpreting section 541(c)(2)'s
reference to "applicable nonbankruptcy law."98 New York is one
state that has enacted such statutory protection for retirement
plans by amending its state exemption statute.99
The New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("NYCPLR")
was amended by the New York State legislature effective July 7,
1989.100 The amendments reflect a desire to protect all retire-
ment plans of debtors from the claims of creditors.10 1 Although
this section of New York law had previously set forth the re-
quirements for state exemptions outside of bankruptcy, the 1989
amendments make specific reference to ERISA and other trusts
and retirement plans, and their treatment in bankruptcy. In
particular, the following provision was added to section 5205:
(c) TRUST EXEMPTION. 3. All trust, custodial accounts, annuities, insur-
ance contracts, monies, assets, or interests described in paragraph two
of this subdivision shall be conclusively presumed to be spendthrift
trusts under this section and the common law of the state of New
97 Prior to such enactments, more knowledgeable debtors would plan their pensions
around existing law. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
" Article 52 of New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules ("NYCPLR") sets forth the
nonbankruptcy exemptions allowed a debtor domiciled in New York. This Article was
amended in July, 1989. This Note will examine the specific treatment of ERISA-quali-
fled and other pension plans as set forth in section 5205(c) of Article 52, and the effect
rendered by this statute in bankruptcy.
100 1989 N.Y. Laws Ch. 280, Assembly Bill A.6356-B, Senate Bill S.3909.
101 Before the amendments, New York adhered to the majority view as expressed by
the Second Circuit in Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1982). Regan held that pension
funds are included in the bankruptcy estate unless they are deemed a spendthrift trust.
This appears to be the only Second Circuit decision on this issue. See also In re Kreiss,
72 B.R. 933, 942 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987); Matter of Hecht, 54 B.R. 379, 382 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd sub. nom., Togut v. Hecht, 69 B.R. 290, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Seven
years after Regan, the New York legislature enacted identical amendments to the Civil
Practice Law and Rules, and Estates, Powers and Trusts Law. These amendments man-
dated that spendthrift status be accorded certain qualified retirement plans for the pur-
poses of rendering them exempt from the claims of creditors both in and outside of
bankruptcy. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 5205(c)(3) (McKinney 1990); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW §§ 7-3.1(b)(1), (2) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
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York for all purposes, including, but not limited to, all cases arising
under or related to a case arising under sections 101 to 1330 of title
11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, as amended.'0 2
As a result, the same treatment formerly accorded beneficiaries
of traditional spendthrift trusts is now granted to New York
debtors, both in and out of bankruptcy, for their retirement
plans. Qualified plans now enjoy statutory protection regardless
of whether they are self-settled or indeed true spendthrift
trusts.10 3 To date, this conclusive presumption has been applied
by two New York bankruptcy courts-in In re Kleist 0' and in
In re Iacono'0 -with different results.
A. The New York Cases
In Kleist the debtor participated in a "Savings and Security
Fund," a retirement plan sponsored by his employer.01 The
plan qualified for preferential tax treatment under the I.R.C.,107
but withdrawals were allowed for any reason.10 8 Kleist claimed
102 N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. L & R. § 5205(c)(3) (McKinney 1990) (emphasis added). In addi-
tion, paragraph 2, to which this subsection refers, reads as follows:
2. For purposes of this subdivision, all trusts, custodial accounts, annuities,
insurance contracts, monies, assets or interests established as part of, and all
payments from, either a Keogh (HR-10), retirement or other plan established
by a corporation, which is qualified under section 401 of the United States
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, or created as a result of rollovers
from such plans pursuant to sections 402(a)(5), 403(a)(4) or 408(d)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, shall be considered a trust which
has been created by or which has proceeded from a person other than the
judgment debtor, even though such judgment debtor is (i) a self-employed in-
dividual, (ii) a partner of the entity sponsoring the Keogh (HR-10) plan, or (iii)
a shareholder of the corporation sponsoring the retirement or other plan.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L & R. § 5205(c)(2) (McKinney 1990) (emphasis added).
103 The interest of a beneficiary in a true spendthrift trust cannot be reached by his
or her creditors. N.Y. EST. PowERs & TausTs LAw § 7-1.5(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
Traditionally, state spendthrift law has held that a self-settled trust, which benefits its
creator, is ineffective or void as against existing or subsequent creditors of the creator.
N.Y. EST. Powr s & TRusTs LAW § 7-3.1(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991). Hence, because a
self-settled trust cannot operate to exclude creditors, it may not be deemed a spendthrift
trust.
114 B.R. 366 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1990).
101 120 B.R. 691 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990).
10' Kleist, 114 B.R. at 366.
107 The Kleist plan qualified under section 401(a) of the LR.C. It was not, however,
ERISA-qualified. Therefore, ERISA's anti-alienation and preemptive provisions did not
govern the administration of the plan.
108 Kleist, 114 B.R. at 367. At the time of filing, the debtor's vested interest totalled
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his entire vested interest was exempt under applicable law;100
the trustee objected, arguing that the debtor's ability to reach all
of the funds at any time made the plan akin to a savings plan
and therefore not exempt as a pension for future support. The
bankruptcy court agreed, holding that the state exemption was
inapplicable to the Kleist plan.1"0 The court nevertheless ex-
cluded the plan and in doing so addressed the exclusionary ef-
fect of amended section 5205(c). 111
According to the Kleist court, the legislature dictated a
mandatory interpretation by employing the phrase "conclusively
presumed" in the statute. A court interpreting such statutory
language 12 is left with little choice but to consider any trust fall-
ing within the statute's parameters as spendthrift."' 3 The stat-
ute's broad language demonstrated the legislature's intent not to
limit exclusion to spendthrift trusts and true retirement plans,
but instead to protect other types of plans as well. The Kleist
court reluctantly sheltered the plan under the broad statutory
language and excluded it from the bankruptcy estate. It rea-
soned that to do otherwise in light of the amendment would
usurp a legislative function. Nonetheless, the court expressed
displeasure with the "bootstrapping" technique used by the New
$11,971. He could therefore withdraw this entire amount the day before bankruptcy or, if
exempt from the estate, the day after bankruptcy. However, the right of withdrawal was
limited to once per year.
oI New York has "opted out" of the federal exemption scheme set forth in the
Code. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 284 (McKinney 1990). Therefore, instead of section
522(d) of the Code being "applicable law," the New York debtor must look to section 282
of New York Debtor and Creditor Law to exempt property from the estate. Section
282(2)(e) exempts pension plans as follows:
2. Bankruptcy exemption for right to receive benefits. The debtor's right to
receive or the debtor's interest in . . . (e) all payments under a stock bonus,
pension, profit sharing or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disabil-
ity, death, age, or length of service unless (i) such plan or contract, except
those qualified under section 401 of the United States Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, as amended, was established by the debtor or under the auspices of an
insider that employed the debtor.
N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 282(2)(e) (McKinney 1990).
110 Kleist, 114 B.R. at 368.
. Section 5205(c) was amended exactly two months before the Kleists filed their
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Id. at 369 n.2.
12 Kleist noted that such a statutory presumption renders the existence of a fact
irrebuttable. Id. at 369 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1067 (5th ed. 1979)).
M Despite an "abundance of countervailing evidence," the statute forced the pre-
sumption that a trust was "spendthrift." Id. at 369.
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York legislature to protect pension plans,""" noting the potential
for abuse by such a presumption.115
Although Kleist upheld the statute, subsequent courts ad-
dressing this issue have expressed general disapproval of such
broad, artificially protective measures. Seven months after
Kleist, another New York bankruptcy court made headlines"1 '
when it refused to interpret the same statute as including a
debtor's individual retirement plan in In re Iacono.
1
"7
Iacono addressed the issue of whether an IRA is excluded or
exempt in a chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.11 8 The debtors,
husband and wife, filed a joint petition under chapter 7 of the
Code. They claimed that their IRA was exempt under prior New
York case law.119 But in a departure from precedent, the Iacono
court refused to find that the IRA was automatically exempt,
114 The court observed:
Congress has declared, through Code § 541(c)(2), that deference will be ac-
corded to the respective state created boundaries defining spendthrift trusts.
New York has exercised its prerogative by "bootstrapping," that is, statutorily
placing certain property under the control of the debtor within the protection
ordinarily provided only to trusts possessing traditional spendthrift qualities.
Id. at 370.
I'l The Kleist court opined:
The potential for abuse created by the New York legislature's use of a "conclu-
sive presumption" in this context, also a product of the 1989 amendments, is
further troubling. It allows debtors to retain the freedom to withdraw their
funds, while simultaneously insulating those assets from creditors. The effect
of this dichotomous treatment appears, unfortunately, to subvert the policy
underlying the state spendthrift trust law, as well as the United States Bank-
ruptcy Code's intent.
Id. at 369-70 (citations omitted). Despite the court's doubts, the Kleist court included
the Savings and Security Fund within the "other plan" language of the statute, appar-
ently feeling helpless to do otherwise.
I" Cerisse Anderson, IRAs Ruled Subject to Creditors' Claims, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 15,
1990, at 1.
7 120 B.R. 691 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990).
", An IRA is an individual retirement account. See supra note 14. These types of
accounts were originally established to encourage individual employees with no other
pension or retirement plans to establish savings for their future needs, while easing their
present tax burden to enable them to do so. Id. at 693 (citing Pub. L. 93-406, 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4791).
,"' The debtors relied on In re Fill 84 B.R. 332 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). In Fill an
IRA was assumed to be property of the estate. lacono rejected such an assumption, in-
stead opting to reexamine the statutes involved, especially in view of the recent amend-
ments to both New York's Debtor and Creditor Law, and the NYCPLR. Id. at 694-95. At
the time of bankruptcy, the amount of the Iaconos' IRA totalled $4,400.00. Id. at 692.
This exemption was claimed pursuant to section 282(2)(e) of the New York Debtor and
Creditor Law. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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instead holding that the issue of whether an IRA was property
of the estate was never fully decided in New York. 120 The court
opted to reexamine an IRA's treatment under the relevant New
York statutes to determine whether it was directly or indirectly
protected.12
Under the New York Debtor and Creditor Law, personal
property that is exempt under section 5205(c) of the NYCPLR
will remain exempt in bankruptcy.122 To be included under the
broad protective umbrella of section 5205(c), an account must be
"established as part of a retirement or other plan established by
a corporation."' 23 An IRA, clearly private and individual in na-
ture, cannot qualify under this language because it is not estab-
lished by a corporation. Moreover, an IRA cannot be excluded as
a spendthrift trust because it is, in essence, a self-settled savings
plan created by and for the debtor's benefit. 2 4 In addition, the
120 The debtors relied upon the Fill opinion that emphasized the standards applied
by the bankruptcy court to decide the proper amount of retirement benefits reasonably
necessary for the debtor's support. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. Iacono
observed that the amended statute deleted the "reasonably necessary" language, thereby
rendering a Fill-type analysis inapplicable. In addition, Iacono noted that the Fill court's
automatic inclusion of IRA funds within the parameters of New York's exemption law
was without any analysis or support. For that reason, an analysis supporting or denying
the exclusion of such funds was now appropriate as it applied to the Iaconos. Id. at 694-
95.
121 New York Debtor and Creditor Law directly exempts a debtor's right to receive
"all payments under a stock bonus, pension, profit sharing, or similar plan or contract on
account of illness, disability, death, age or length of service." N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §
282(2)(e) (McKinney 1990). Therefore, for the Iaconos' IRA to be exempt, it would have
had to qualify as a similar plan or contract. The court held that it did not. An indirect
exemption would have applied to the IRA if it had been first exempt under section
5205(c) of the NYCPLR, because section 282 preserves as exempt all personal and real
property that is already exempt from the claims of creditors under section 5205(c). See
infra note 122 and accompanying text.
122 New York Debtor and Creditor law provides:
§ 282. Permissible exemptions in bankruptcy.
Under section five hundred twenty-two of title eleven of the United States
Code, entitled "Bankruptcy," an individual debtor domiciled in this state may
exempt from the property of the estate, to the extent permitted by subsection
(b) thereof, only (i) personal and real property exempt from application to the
satisfaction of money judgments under sections fifty-two hundred five and
fifty-two hundred six of the civil practice law and rules.
N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 282 (1984).
123 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 5205(c)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
124 Iacono compared an IRA to a traditional pension plan, observing that "the most
compelling distinction is the [d]ebtors' ability to exercise complete control over the
funds." Such total control by debtors is "clearly inapposite to the underlying policy of
preserving the pension funds until retirement." Iacono, 120 B.R. at 694. This kind of
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language in section 5205(c) contained no specific reference to
IRAs, even though they were well known and widely popular at
the time the statute was amended. The Iacono court concluded
that the New York legislature had not intended to protect IRA-
type retirement plans from creditors either in or out of
bankruptcy.125
The Kleist and Iacono courts produced different results in
applying the same statute to comparable retirement plans. 26 In
each of their zealous analyses, however, both New York bank-
ruptcy courts failed to address an obvious problem presented by
the New York amendment: in passing a statute that by its own
language applies to "all cases arising under or related to a case
arising under .. . title 11 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code," the New York legislature apparently overstepped federal
constitutional boundaries.127 This clear attempt by New York's
legislature to establish rules that affect bankruptcies is in viola-
tion of the constitutional mandate that Congress alone "shall
have the power to. . .establish uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States."1 28 Nonetheless,
neither court declared the statute unconstitutional on its face,
instead expressing concern about the effect of the statute in
dicta. 29 However, in less than one year, another state's bank-
control distinguished an IRA from the type of retirement plan that was traditionally
exempt from the claims and excluded from the bankruptcy estate. See supra note 92 and
accompanying text. Subsequent bankruptcy cases involving individual retirement plans
have concurred with Iacono. See, e.g., In re Swenson, 130 B.R. 99 (Bankr. D. Utah 1991)
(debtor's IRA did not fall within Utah's exemption for "annuity or other similar plan");
In re Kramer, 128 B.R. 707 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991). See also Sterbach, et. al., supra note
64, at 254-56.
"I' "This court believes that to construe the language of either section [§ 282(2)(e)
or § 5205(c)] to include an IRA would clearly be judicial legislation." Iacona, 120 B-R. at
695.
" Kleist and Iacono did not analyze identical retirement plans in arriving at their
respective conclusions. Kleist concerned an employer-sponsored retirement plan,
whereas Iacono concerned an entirely self-created individual retirement account. For the
purposes of this Note, however, both plans qualified for preferential tax treatment under
LIC. § 401, contained rio restrictions on assignment or alienation, allowed the debtors
unrestricted access to funds and were viewed a' being akin to a savings plan rather than
funds intended for future maintenance. In re Kleist, 114 B.R. 366, 367-68 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1990); Iacono, 120 B.R. at 693-94.
127 N.Y. Civ. PRArC L & R. § 5205(c)(3).
128 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cL 4.
I'l See supra note 114 and accompanying text. This constitutional issue will be ad-
dressed in In re Wimmer, infra note 130.
1992]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
ruptcy court picked up where New York left off. By mid-1991 an
Illinois statute regarding trusts and retirement plans, similar to
New York's section 5205(c), was at issue in In re Wimmer.5 0
This Illinois decision may be the definitive pronouncement on
state legislation in the bankruptcy area.
B. The Illinois Approach
Wimmer concerned the exclusion of an ERISA-qualified
employee benefit plan from a chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. The
debtor, Cynthia Sue Wimmer, had terminated her employment
before bankruptcy and was therefore entitled to a lump sum dis-
tribution of her interest.131 She claimed that the plan was pro-
tected as a spendthrift trust by virtue of an Illinois exemption
statute 3 2 which provided that a retirement plan qualifying for
favorable tax treatment would be "conclusively presumed to be
a spendthrift trust" under state law.133 Since the plan contained
the requisite anti-alienation language to qualify for preferential
tax treatment under the I.R.C., the debtor asserted that the plan
should be treated as a spendthrift trust under state law and
therefore excluded from the bankruptcy estate under section
541(c) (2)'s exception for spendthrift trusts. 34
The Illinois bankruptcy court did not agree. Following the
logic of Iacono, the court refused to apply the plain meaning of
the statute, as amended, automatically. Instead, it looked at the
overall effect of the statutory presumption and the legislative
motivation behind the recent enactments.'35 The mandatory
130 129 B.R. 563 (C.D. Ill. 1991), afl'g, 121 B.R. 539 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1990).
"1 At the time of bankruptcy, the debtor's interest in the plan totalled $8,526.92.
Because no demand for distribution had been made prior to bankruptcy, this entire
amount remained in the employee "thrift and savings plan." Wimmer, 129 B.R. at 565.
"' ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 para. 12-1006(c) (1989).
' The Illinois statute provides:
A retirement plan that is (i) intended in good faith to qualify as a retirement
plan under the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
now or hereafter amended, or (ii) a public employee pension plan created
under the Illinois Pension Code, as now or hereafter amended, is conclusively
presumed to be a spendthrift trust under the law of Illinois.
Wimmer, 121 B.R. at 542 (citing Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110
para. 12-1006(c) (1989)).
The above paragraph is nearly identical to the spendthrift presumption found in
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 5205(c)(3).
Wimmer, 129 B.R. at 565-66; 121 B.R. at 542.
The provisions of the Illinois statute at issue in Wimmer were amended August
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spendthrift presumption that provided a blanket exclusion for
pension plans sought to protect all pension plans of debtors in
bankruptcy, whether or not the plans were true spendthrift
trusts.136 Conversely, a goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to expand
the estate by gathering together assets of the debtor for distribu-
tion to creditors. 37 Given the conflict between the state statute
and federal bankruptcy law, the Wimmer court found that en-
forcement of the Illinois spendthrift presumption would be out
of the question; moreover, it would be unconstitutional.' 33
The Constitution vests Congress with the power to establish
bankruptcy laws. 3' Because Congress has established exclusive
federal jurisdiction over a11 bankruptcy proceedings, 140 the field
has been preempted from state regulation. 1" The Illinois stat-
ute, with its broad reference to bankruptcy cases, regulates a
material aspect of the bankruptcy proceeding: the determination
of what property constitutes the bankruptcy estate.142 State
statutes that impose "conclusive presumptions" for cases arising
under the Bankruptcy Code could therefore be seen as an imper-
missible attempt to usurp congressional power and authority.
4 3
In addition to the State's attempt to regulate bankruptcies,
the Illinois law was contrary to the Code itself. The enactment
of a conclusive spendthrift presumption for the specific purpose
of avoiding the inclusion of pension plans in the estate 44 under-
mined a primary goal of the Code to enlarge the amount of as-
sets available to creditors.14 Thus, not only do such statutes
force courts to gloss over the true origins of a trust, 40 they con-
30, 1989.
118 Wimmer, 129 B.R. at 567; 121 B.R. at 543.
I See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text
Wimmer, 121 B.R. at 543.
"' The Constitution provides: "Congress shall have the Power To establish a uni-
form Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies through -
out the United States." U.S. CoNsT., art. I § 8, cL 4.
140 The United States Code grants federal jurisdiction over all banruptcy cazes:
"Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district court shall have origi-
nal and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under Title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1983).
11 In re Goerg, 844 F.2d 1562, 1565 (l1th Cir. 1988).
141 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
Wimmer, 121 B.R. at 543.
144 Id.
15 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), (c)(1) (1984). See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
10 "A legislature may not employ conclusive presumptions to legislate a fact which
is at odds with actualities." Wimmer, 121 B.R. at 543, citing Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S.
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travene a provision of federal bankruptcy law as well.1 47 The
Wimmer court viewed this as a clear violation of the Supremacy
Clause, rendering the statute unconstitutional and invalid. 148
Wimmer thus ventured further than Kleist dared, and in so do-
ing, obtained the more desirable result. 149 In Illinois, at least, the
Bankruptcy Code now reigns supreme. 1 0
312 (1982).
147 According to the court, the statute undermined the Bankruptcy Code in two ba-
sic ways. First, the statute tried to limit the property of the estate in contravention of
section 541(a)(1) of the Code. Second, it excluded nonspendthrift retirement plans from
the estate despite the intent of Congress to limit section 541(c)(2) to traditional spend-
thrift trusts only. For this reason, under the majority view, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 para.
12-1006(c) was "a bold attempt to undermine section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code
which cannot succeed." Id.
On appeal, the district court affirmed the conclusion of the bankruptcy court but did
not rule on the supremacy issue. Instead, the district court declined to reach the issue of
whether the Illinois statute conflicted with, and was preempted by, section 541(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code under the Supremacy Clause, stating: "This Court simply concludes
that § 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code does not create and was not intended to create
an exclusion for spendthrift trusts which are defined as broadly as the Illinois statute
chose to define them." Wimmer, 129 B.R. 563, 568 (C.D. Ill. 1991).
M The Supremacy Clause to the Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judge in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
149 The district court observed:
Apparently, the Kleist court believed that Congress, by enacting § 541(c)(2),
intended to give states the prerogative to define a spendthrift trust in any
manner the states felt was appropriate. Such a conclusion is contrary to the
legislative intent of Congress as expressed in the legislative history of this sec-
tion and contrary to the plain language of the statute.
Wimmer, 129 B.R. 563, 568 (C.D. Ill. 1991).
The bankruptcy court also noted Kleist's concern over the New York statute and
the potential for abuse that could result: "It is essentially for those reasons that this
Court reaches an opposite conclusion." Wimmer, 121 B.R. 539, 544 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1990).
Wimmer's holding, however, may have been unnecessarily broad. Federal bank-
ruptcy law does not force all state laws that may affect bankruptcy proceedings to yield
under the Supremacy Clause. Congress recognized this when enacting the Code in 1978:
"The Bankruptcy Act incorporates State and general Federal law in many important
areas." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 5 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.CAN. 5963, 5971. For example, the Code looks to state law regarding a debtor's
rights in real property, contracts and tort. In addition, the Code allows state law to de-
termine a debtor's exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988).
150 This reign is not absolute. During approximately the same period that both
Wimmer decisions were issued, two other Illinois bankruptcy courts reached opposite
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Although Kleist, Iacono and Wimmer all yield different and
interesting results, none involved ERISA-qualified retirement
plans. As a result, none of those courts considered a different
and very serious challenge to the 1989 New York amendment:
ERISA's dominance over state pension law. Because ERISA su-
persedes related state laws, the vast majority of courts have held
similar statutes invalid. 5" Frequent invalidation of state laws
that refer to plans qualified under ERISA is justified by the doc-
trine of preemption.
C. Preemption Of The New York Statute As It Relates To
ERISA Plans
ERISA's section 514(a) preempts all relevant state laws.10 2
It provides that "[t]he provisions of this subchapter ... shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in Sec-
tion 1003(b) of this title."1 53 In 1988 the Supreme Court inter-
preted this language to mean that all state laws that "relate to"
a qualified ERISA plan were preempted and thus invalid.'
Since then a line of cases has invalidated most state statutes
conclusions regarding the constitutionality of the Illinois statute. In re Block, 121 B.R.
810 (Bankr. C.D. 11. 1990) and In re Belay, 113 B.R. 429 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990), decided
before Wimmer, enforced the spendthrift presumption imposed by IL. Rmn. STAT. Ch.
110 para. 12-1006(c). In Balay the debtor had filed bankruptcy before the amended stat-
ute became effective but the bankruptcy court rendered its decision after that date. The
court expressly agreed with the majority view of including ERISA plans in the bank-
ruptcy estate and held that the debtor's plan was included in the estate because it could
not be governed by a law not yet in effect at the date of the bankruptcy filing. In dicta,
however, the court discussed the intended effect of the Illinois statute at length, conclud-
ing that the statute was enforceable and was not preempted by ERISA. The court de-
ferred to the legislative desire to carve out a narrow exception to Illinois spendthrift law,
and further held that ERISA did not preempt paragraph (c) because that paragraph
could be read independently of the statute's other provisions. 113 B.R. at 442-43. In
Block the debtor was the sole owner, shareholder and officer of a corporation, and was a
beneficiary of an employee-sponsored pension plan that qualified under ERISA. The
debtor was the sole trustee of both the pension plan valued at $93,941 and a profit-
sharing plan valued at $78,857, in which he was fully vested. The court allowed both
interests to be fully excluded from the estate, agreeing with Balay that paragraph 12-
1006(c) represented a legitimate exclusion created by the Illinois legislature, and was
therefore enforceable against the Bankruptcy Trustee. 121 B.R. at 813.
" See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 152-54 and accom-
panying text.
'52 9 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1975).
153 ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1985 and Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1983).
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specifically enacted to protect ERISA plans.155 Under the doc-
trine of preemption, ERISA, created to protect and preserve
pension and retirement funds, invalidates state laws enacted for
the same reason-to protect ERISA. 5 e When state laws shield-
ing ERISA plans are preempted, creditors may then gain access
to ERISA funds via the bankruptcy proceeding. Although the
155 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S.Ct. 478 (1990) (state law which purports
to protect employee benefit plans under ERISA by granting cause of action to employees
for wrongful discharge was preempted by ERISA); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S.Ct. 403
(1990) (state law which precludes reimbursement from benefit payments under a quali-
fied plan for medical expenses paid by employer was preempted by ERISA); Mackey,
486 U.S. at 825 (ERISA preempts Georgia statute which singled out ERISA welfare plan
benefits for protective treatment); Mullenix v. Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Co.,
912 F.2d 1406 (11th Cir. 1990) (Alabama statute which provided that ERISA plan par-
ticipants have the right to medical services notwithstanding any plan provision to the
contrary related to ERISA under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) was preempted); PPG Industries
Pension Plan A (CIO) v. Crews, 902 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1990) (West Virginia statute
which required employer to maintain account for workers' compensation separate from
pension benefit account, so that latter would be protected, was preempted by ERISA); In
re Wimmer, 129 B.R. 563, 569 (C.D. Ill. 1991) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 para. 12.1006(c)
(1989) clearly "relates to" an employee benefit plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) and is
preempted under the Supreme Court's view in Mackey); In re Komet, 104 B.R. 799
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (Texas statute exempting ERISA plans from state law attach-
ment, execution or seizure impermissibly interferes with ERISA and is preempted);
United Health Serv. v. Upstate Admin. Serv., 573 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. Broome
County 1991) (public health law which contains "reference" to benefit governed by
ERISA is preempted; preemption is warranted if an indirect effect results).
But see In re Nuttleman, 117 B.R. 975, 982 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990) (ERISA does not
preempt state statute exempting plans qualified under I.R.C. § 401(a) because preemp-
tion would modify and impair 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) of the Code that delegates to
states the right to create their own bankruptcy exemptions; preemption would therefore
violate 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) of ERISA); In re Vickers, 116 B.R. 149 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1990) (since the Code specifically allows the states to create their own exemptions and
ERISA does not specifically prohibit such exemptions, state statute exempting pension
plans qualified under I.R.C. § 401(a) is not preempted by ERISA); In re Balay, 113 B.R.
429, 443 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (state statute mandating that plans qualified under ap-
plicable provisions of the I.R.C. were conclusively presumed spendthrift trusts and were
capable of being executed and enforced independently of other provisions which referred
to ERISA more directly, and hence was not preempted).
" This is a basic facet of preemption. Under the United States Constitution's
Supremacy Clause, federal laws cut off both conflicting and enabling state statutes. See
supra note 148 and accompanying text. In Mackey the Supreme Court's broad construc-
tion of ERISA's preemptive powers, even state law that furthers ERISA's purposes, is
preempted because 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) "displaces all state laws that fall within its
sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with ERISA's substantive require-
ments." Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829 (1988). Therefore, despite the seemingly ironic result
reached by the court that was achieved by integrating ERISA with state exemption law,
the Court refused to restrict ERISA's preemptive provision to only those state laws with
which it conflicts.
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1989 amendments to the NYCPLR were enacted to prevent this
very result, ERISA itself preempts the New York legislature's
authority to do so.15
15 The amendments to section 5205 were enacted to assist self-employed individu-
als, partnerships and professional corporations in preserving private retirement plans
that would otherwise have been subject to the claims of creditors in the event of a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. Memorandum of Senator Dale M. Volker and Assemblyman Sheldon
Silver, Bill A.6356-A, in Bill Jacket to 1989 N.Y. Laws 280. Although section 5205 had
been amended in 1987 for the purpose of protecting retirement plans from the claims of
judgment creditors, an explicit reference to cases arising under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code had not been included. Assembly Bill A.3262-B, 1987 N.Y. Laws 108. The
1987 Bill, also introduced by Senator Volker and Assemblyman Silver, sought to protect
private retirement plans of the self-employed and the solo legal and medical practitioner
by specifically exempting trusts, custodial accounts, annuity and insurance contracts es-
tablished as part of a pension, profit sharing, or Keogh (HR-10) plan, from the claims of
a judgment creditor. In addition, qualified plans were exempt from federal taxation. N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. L. & R. §§ 5205(c)(1), (2), (3); N.Y. Esr. PowERs & TRuSm LAw §§ 7-3.1(a),
(b)(1), (2) (McKinney 1987). Notably, the 1987 amendments to the NYCPLR were en-
acted one year before Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc., 488 U.S. 825
(1988), was decided. Mackey made clear that state exemption statutes which contained
specific references to plans qualified under pertinent provisions of the LR.C. related to
ERISA, and were therefore preempted. In the wake of Mackey, therefore, it is likely that
the 1987 amendments would not have survived when applied to an ERISA plan. See
supra note 156 and accompanying text.
After 1987, an increase in bankruptcy filings and ever-mounting new case law saw
these same retirement plans, although exempt outside of bankruptcy, held subject to the
claims of creditors within bankruptcy. Accordingly, as support for the spendthrift provi-
sion, the 1989 Memorandum in Support noted that specific protection of retirement
plans in bankruptcy was necessary both to protect the pensioner's interest and to guard
against the threat of tax disqualification. A 1988 private letter ruling issued by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, PLR 8829009, was cited in support. See supra note 85 and accom-
panying text. See also Letter of Michael Colodner to Honorable Evan A. Davis, June 9,
1989, page 1 (regarding Assembly Bill 6356). The Memorandum also cited the "increas-
ingly callous manner with which bankruptcy courts are including qualified plan interests
as assets available to bankruptcy creditors" as further justification for the spendthrift
provision. New York State Bar Association, Report No. 140, April 13, 1989, at 2.
Interestingly, major supporters of an absolute exemption for private retirement
plans were the New York State Bar Assocation, the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants and the Medical
Society of the State of New York. Given the fact that attorneys, accountants and physi-
cians constitute the majority of self-employed individuals capable of establishing gener-
ous, self-funded retirement plans, the enthusiastic support of these organizations for a
bill that adversely affects the rights of all future bankruptcy creditors is self-serving.
Accordingly, the danger of abuse inherent in such "bootstrapping" was aptly ignored or
minimized. Letter of James F. Regan, Chairman of Permanent Commission on Public
Employee Pension and Retirement Systems, July 7, 1989; Letter of Ira H. Lustgarten,
Committee on Trusts, Estate and Surrogates' Court, June 28, 1989, Bill Jacket to 1989
Laws of New York, Ch. 280.
The Supreme Court's view of ERISA's preemptive powers, clarified in the 1988
Mackey decision, (although not yet known at the time of the 1987 amendments) was
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Nor can there be any argument that there is insufficient
conflict between NYCPLR section 5205(c) and ERISA to trigger
preemption. Section 5205(c) refers to "trusts. . . . retirement or
other plan(s) established by a corporation, which is qualified
under section 401 of the United States Internal Revenue Code of
1986. ''15 This clearly touches ERISA since ERISA is qualified
under section 401 of the I.R.C. through its anti-alienation and
anti-garnishment provisions. In addition, similar cases sup-
porting the preemption of state laws as they relate to ERISA
strongly suggest that New York, for reasons of policy and statu-
tory interpretation, will follow suit when an ERISA plan is in-
volved.1 s0 The trend clearly has been to subject pension plans to
the claims of creditors. 6'
well-known to the legislature by the summer of 1989. Yet Mackey and its potential effect
on these amendments was totally ignored. Memorandum in Support, Assembly Bill
A.6356-A, S.3909; Letter of Richard L. Smith to Honorable Gerald Crotty, July 5, 1989,
at 3 printed in Bill Jacket to 1989 Laws of New York, ch. 280. The amendments were
approved by a unanimous vote in both the Senate and the Assembly.
108 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 5205(c).
100 The I.R.C. provides that pension plans and trusts, in order to be tax qualified,
must contain a provision prohibiting the assignment or alienation of benefits. 26 U.S.C. §
401(a)(13). The restrictions found in 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), ERISA § 206(d) satisfy this
requirement.
0 In re Wimmer, 121 B.R. 539, 544 n.2 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1990), af'd, 129 B.R. 563
(C.D. Ill. 1991). In addition to invalidating the Illinois statute's spendthrift presumption
under the Supremacy Clause, the bankruptcy court strongly suggested that such lan-
guage would be invalidated when applied to an ERISA plan. The court noted that the
language of ILL. REV. STAT. § 12-1006(c) related to ERISA in such a way that it would
probably not survive the preemptive powers found in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) when tested by
a qualified plan. Moreover, "express references to ERISA are not required to trigger the
superseding language of 29 U.S.C. Section 1144(a)." Sterbach et. al., supra note 64, at
247. A state law may "relate to" an employee benefit plan if it has only a mere connec-
tion or reference to the plan, and may be preempted by ERISA even if the effect is
unintended and indirect. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S.Ct. 478, 483 (1990)
(citing Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983), and Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987)).
The prediction of the bankruptcy court proved accurate. On appeal, the district
court observed that the language of the Illinois Civil Practice Act § 12-1006(a) referred
to any plan "intended in good faith to qualify as a retirement plan under applicable
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986." Wimmer, 129 B.R. at 569 (C.D. Ill.
1991). Citing the Supreme Court's ruling in Mackey, the district court held that this was
a clear attempt to affect employee benefit plans: "the Illinois statute in this case clearly
'relates to' an employee benefit plan." Therefore, it was preempted by ERISA. Id.
161 In re Kramer, 128 B.R. 707, 709 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (agreeing with Iacono
that an I.R.A. was not excluded under section 541(c)(2), nor was it a spendthrift trust
under N.Y. EsT. Pow Rs & TRusTs LAW § 7-3.1; potential to exercise complete control
over fund is "inconsistent with the concept of a spendthrift trust").
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Accordingly, the New York legislature would be well advised
to repeal the recent changes to the NYCPLR. Rather than im-
pose blanket treatment of all qualified plans, a more individual-
ized approach is needed to serve the purposes of equity. A case-
by-case inquiry into the individual circumstances surrounding a
plan would more adequately protect trusts and pensions not
subject to the debtor's control while still allowing creditors in
the bankruptcy proceeding to share in the distribution of other
types of self-settled funds. 6 2
This Note takes the position that New York should follow
the path of the Ninth Circuit. By determining the property of
the estate in accordance with the debtor's control, the New York
legislature would promote ERISA's goal of protecting pensioners
and their beneficiaries to a reasonable' extent, while still respect-
ing the policies of equitable treatment and distribution that un-
derlie the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, such treatment of quali-
fied benefit plans also respects congressional intent regarding
the preservation in bankruptcy of the debtor's interest in a
162 The Ninth Circuit took this approach in In re Neuton, 922 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir.
1990). The Neutons filed a Chapter 7 petition in bankruptcy, claiming as exempt their
interest in a trust by virtue of the trust's restriction on alienation and garnishment. This
restriction read as follows: "The interests of beneficiaries in principal or income shall not
be subject to claims of their creditors or others nor to legal process, and may not be
voluntarily or involuntarily alienated or encumbered." Id. at 1381 n.1. The debtors ar-
gued that since this provision prevented the debtor or creditors from reaching the
corpus, the trust qualified as spendthrift and should be excluded from the bankruptcy
estate under section 541(c)(2). The parties did not dispute that the above provision was
enforceable under California law. However, the California Probate Code limited the force
of this provision by allowing the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust to order the trustee to
pay up to 25% of the beneficiary's expected payment to satisfy a judgment creditor. Id.
at 1383, citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 15306.5 (West 1986). Because the state allowed the
debtors access to one-quarter of their interest, the entire trust could not be deemed
spendthrift within the meaning of section 541(c)(2). As a result, the 25% subject to the
debtor's control was held to be property of the estate, although still subject to an exemp-
tion to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor or his or her depen-
dents. Id. at 1384, citing CAI. PROB. CODE § 15306.5(C).
The Ninth Circuit also recognized that the remaining 75% of the trust could not be
reached by the debtor under any circumstances. The court agreed with both the Bank-
ruptcy Court and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel that California law extends auto-
matic, absolute protection to 75% of a debtor's interest in a trust which prohibits aliena-
tion. Id. at 1383-84 n.5. Accordingly, three-quarters of the trust deserved traditional
spendthrift status and the restriction prohibiting alienation was enforceable in bank-
ruptcy. Id. at 1383. Thus, to the extent that the debtor was prohibited from controlling
his or her own interest, it was excluded from the estate. To the extent that the debtor
could order payment from the trust, his or her interest was made subject to the claims of
all creditors in bankruptcy. Id. (citing In re Peterson, 88 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D. Me. 1988)).
1992]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
spendthrift trust, to the extent that it is truly spendthrift. Such
an inquiry would be within the discretion of the bankruptcy
court.163 In any event, a debtor's pension cannot be protected by
state legislation that should always be held invalid under
preemption.
CONCLUSION
The conflict among ERISA, state pension law and the
Bankruptcy Code is clear. Most courts include ERISA retire-
ment plans in the bankruptcy estate to the extent of the
debtor's control, while the minority finds that ERISA's restric-
tions on transfer require excluding such plans as property of the
estate. Although sound arguments support the minority's protec-
tion of ERISA, the blanket exclusion of all plans without further
individual inquiry poses a dual threat: the inequitable treatment
of creditors and the increased threat of manipulative filings by
debtors with generous self-funded pensions.164 Moreover, by pro-
113 The bankruptcy court was allowed such discretion before the amendments to the
New York Debtor and Creditor Law. Before the July 1989 amendments, section 282(2)(e)
permitted a bankruptcy exemption for the debtor's interest in "payments under a stock
bonus, pension, profit sharing, or similar plan or contract ... unless ... established by
the debtor or under the auspices of an insider that employed the debtor.., to the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and the debtor's dependents." N.Y.
DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 282(2)(e). The determination of what amount was reasonably nec-
essary for the debtor's support was within the discretion of the bankruptcy court and
was determined on a case-by-case basis. See In re Donaghy, 11 B.R. 677 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1981).
The 1989 amendments made two notable changes to this exemption statute. First,
the specific phrase referring to payments "reasonably necessary for the debtor's support"
was deleted and an exception to the exclusion of self-settled plans, established by the
debtor, was added. Second, plans that were "qualified under Section 401 of the United
States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended" were now exempt even though "es-
tablished by the debtor under the auspices of an insider that employed the debtor." The
result of the amendment was to deprive the bankruptcy court of any discretion to deter-
mine what amount of pension benefits were reasonably necessary for the debtor's sup-
port, by allowing a full and unqualified exemption to any trust which came under the
purview of section 282(2). Letter of Richard L. Smith to Honorable Mario M. Cuomo,
Governor, State of New York, July 5, 1989, at 3, printed in Bill Jacket to 1989 Laws of
New York, Ch. 280. Further, the reference to plans qualified under I.R.C. § 401 had the
obvious and much intended effect of bringing ERISA within the statute's absolute pro-
tection, regardless of whether the plan was self-settled. Id.
This Note takes the position that the statute's original language, which mirrored
section 522(d)(10)(E) of the Bankruptcy Code, should be reinstated.
10 Before both the Wimmer decision and the enactment of the statutory spend-
thrift presumption, an Illinois bankruptcy court succinctly stated that "if a bankruptcy
trustee can never reach funds held in an ERISA-qualified pension plan, then there is too
[Vol. 58: 177
ERISA BENEFITS IN BANKRUPTCY
viding a federal exemption for ERISA-qualified plans in section
522(d) (10) (E) of the Code, Congress envisioned the needs-based
exemption of such plans from the bankruptcy estate, rather than
their exclusion. The majority view provides fairer treatment
overall and preserves congressional intent behind both ERISA
and the Bankruptcy Code by not permitting the debtor to keep
his or her entire interest in a pension.
In New York, the state legislature's statutory protection of
private retirement plans has not been tested by ERISA's pre-
emptive powers. The trend of current case law, however, indi-
cates that future decisions will likely include all traditional re-
tirement plans in the estate. Because of its fatal reference to
pension plans qualified under the I.R.C., section 5205(c)(3) of
the NYCPLR will be preempted when applied to an ERISA-
qualified plan, or invalidated under the Supremacy Clause as a
usurpation of the Bankruptcy Code. Ultimately, the split among
the federal courts of appeals can only be resolved by the United
States Supreme Court.
Helene Yvette Spielman Sherman
much room for manipulation by a participant anticipating bankruptcy." In re Silldorff,
96 B.R. 859, 863 (C.D. I. 1989).
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